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It is generally agreed that parents should (morally) and
must (legally) support their children until they reach the age of
majority. But, in what circumstances must parents support
their children thereafter? This question becomes further complicated when the children are—or become—disabled. Are parents indefinitely obligated to provide financial support for their
disabled children? If so, is this a purely moral duty or should it
be legally enforceable as well? This Article examines these
questions and posits an answer.
Consider two scenarios. In the first, a nineteen-year-old
boy suffers injuries in a plane crash on his way home for
Christmas. He is left a quadriplegic and is unable to support
himself for the rest of his life. In the second, doctors diagnose a
fifty-five-year-old woman as manic depressive, a condition that
similarly incapacitates her for an indefinite period. Someone
must care for these individuals. The most likely candidates are
their parents or the State. Which individuals or institutions,
however, must ultimately take responsibility? Should the answer depend on the nature of the disability or on whether the
disability developed prior to the age of majority?
A recent California case pointedly raised these issues.
David Culp, a fifty-year-old Stanford Law School graduate who
practiced family law for nineteen years, filed suit against his
parents. Culp claimed to suffer from depression and bipolar
disorder, conditions which made him incapable of supporting
himself.1 Section 3910(a) of the California Family Code states
that “the father and mother have an equal responsibility to
maintain, to the extent of their ability, a child of whatever age
1. See Petition to Enforce Parental Duty to Support Adult Indigent
Child, Culp v. Culp, D279304, (Ventura Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000).
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who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means.”2 Concluding that Culp was in fact disabled and
incapable of supporting himself, the California Superior Court
ordered Culp’s parents, James and Bertha Culp, to pay their
son $3,500 a month indefinitely for living expenses.3
The decision astounds many parents, who are stunned by
the possibility that they might have to support their adult children indefinitely.4 One family law expert referred to the court’s
holding as a “landmark decision.”5 Clearly, the Culp decision
raises difficult issues. We naturally expect parents to care for
their minor children until they are able to care for themselves.
However, our reactions may change when the state forces parents to pay cash to apparently estranged adult children who
become disabled in middle age.
In Part I, I explore the historical background of legally
mandated parental duties to adult disabled children. Part II
surveys the positions of the fifty states with regard to whether
and in what circumstances parents should be required to support their adult children with disabilities. Parts III and IV then
turn to normative questions. Part III explores the moral dimensions of the problem: from a religious or philosophical perspective, should parents support their adult children with disabilities indefinitely? I argue that although a parental moral
duty often exists, society shares this duty, and therefore it is
not absolute. The many difficult and personal considerations to
which this duty is subject complicate the decision whether to
support a disabled child. Part IV explores the problem from a
normative legal perspective: should courts recognize a legally
enforceable requirement that parents support their adult children with disabilities indefinitely regardless of the type of disability, the age of onset, or the family relationship? Section IV
considers several theoretical and practical justifications that
weigh heavily against the imposition of such a legal duty. For
2. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004).
3. See Petition to Enforce Parental Duty to Support Adult Indigent
Child, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See Leslie Parrilla, Judge Orders Parents to Support 50-year-old Son,
VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Aug. 3, 2001, at B01. Even David Culp’s own lawyer,
Jeff Jennings, stated, “[E]very parent I talk to gets shivers when they hear
about it.” Id.
5. See Robert J. Meadows, Editorial, Court Role Expanded, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, Aug. 19, 2001, at B10 (stating that the decision sets a “dangerous precedent” that “expands the court’s role in dictating parental care obligations for adult children”).
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the foregoing reasons, I argue that the law should not impose
an unqualified legally enforceable parental duty to support
adult disabled children.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. PARENTAL DUTIES TOWARD CHILDREN
Prior to the Poor Relief Act of 1601, the common law did
not address whether parents had a legally enforceable duty to
provide support for their children, even when their children
were minors. The family was a single unit, with all income and
property vested in the husband. Since neither the wife nor the
children had any ownership rights, they were entitled only to
that which the husband provided them at his uncontrolled discretion.6 A legal guarantee of parental support was deemed unnecessary since the law presumed that parents regarded their
children with the highest possible degree of affection.7 Furthermore, since society expected children to work, as Blackstone reasoned, “the policy of our laws which are ever watchful
to promote industry, did not mean to compel a father to maintain his idle and lazy children in ease and indolence . . . .”8
In England, the Poor Relief Act of 1601 revised the common law to deter individual reliance on various forms of public
assistance.9 Although these so-called Poor Laws established
limited and localized forms of public aid, the theory underlying
the laws was that poverty was an individual problem, not a social or economic one.10 All able-bodied poor adults and children
6. See 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 498–501 (2d ed. 1987).
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
435 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765) (“By begetting them, therefore they have
entered into a voluntary obligation . . . that the life which they have bestowed
shall be supported and preserved.”).
8. See id. at 437; Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child
Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early Child Support Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1123, 1145–46 (1999) (stating that children were expected to work so they
would not be poor).
9. See Marsha Garrison, Anatomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two
Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 49 (1998).
10. See William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare
Changes in the Millenium [sic] Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages,
9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 103 (1998). The poor were generally divided into
two categories, the aged and impotent poor, who were seen as “worthy” and
deserving of help, and the able-bodied poor, who were unworthy of help and
punished if they refused to work. Id.
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over the age of five had a duty to work.11 The state removed
destitute children from their homes and apprenticed them if
their parents could not maintain them.12 Most importantly for
purposes of this Article, the Elizabethan Poor Laws imposed
the first statutory child support obligations, allowing local parishes and other sources of community support to recover from
fathers the costs of providing aid to destitute single mothers
and their children.13
The system in colonial America addressed the poor individually, often by sheltering them in private homes.14 A parent’s duty to support his children received little formal attention prior to the 1800s.15 Until then, “children were seen as
small adults, valued mainly for their ability to contribute to the
household economy.”16 Attitudes toward child labor stiffened in
the nineteenth century, as the “view of children as economic assets began to give way to a more romantic, idealized view of
childhood among the middle and upper classes.”17
As the American economy shifted from agriculture to industry, social changes threatened to overwhelm the colonial
relief system.18 With population increases and urban growth, a
new class of mobile laborers highly vulnerable to cyclical depressions emerged.19 In addition, desertion became a widespread problem, as men who abandoned their families could relocate and find work in relative anonymity.20 Relaxation of

11. See id. at 103–04.
12. See id. at 105 (“Children under fourteen years of age, and above five,
that live in idleness, and be taken [to] begging, may be put to service by the
governors of cities, towns [and] to husbandry, or other crafts or labours.”).
13. See Garrison, supra note 9, at 48.
14. Shannon Bettis Nakabayashi, A “Dual System” of Family Law Revisited: Current Inequities in California’s Child Support Law, 35 U.S.F. L. REV.
593, 597 (2001). (“Puritan Calvinism considered economic rewards to be a sign
of predestined grace, and class hierarchies provided an opportunity for the
well-to-do to serve society and God by caring for those with less.”).
15. Id. at 598.
16. See Hansen, supra note 8, at 1129.
17. Id. The fact that fourteen states passed child labor restrictions between the late 1830s and 1850s demonstrates growing social disdain for child
labor. Id. at 1130. Indeed, “between the 1820s and the 1840s, most middleclass families withdrew their children from the labor force and kept them in
schools, even though most children from working-class families still needed to
work to supplement their families’ income.” Id.
18. Id. at 1132–33.
19. See id. at 1133.
20. See id. at 1131–32.

BUHAI_4FMT

2007]

2/16/2007 10:00:58 AM

CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

715

divorce laws also led to a steady increase in the divorce rate,
leaving newly divorced mothers to fall into poverty.21
With the increasing number of single mothers and children
in need, courts began to challenge common law tradition, finding an affirmative legal duty that parents keep their children
“off public assistance.”22 In Stanton v. Wilson, one of America’s
earliest child support cases, the court imposed a duty on a father to support his children after divorce, and held further that
that duty did not cease by virtue of his former wife’s remarriage.23 In another early decision, Van Valkinburgh v. Watson,
the court stated:
[a] parent is under a natural obligation to furnish necessaries for his
infant children; and if the parents neglect that duty, any other person
who supplies such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit
on the delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise
to pay on the part of the parent.24

Stanton and Van Valkinburgh thereby began to delineate factual situations in which courts would recognize child support
obligations.25
The Elizabethan Poor Laws provided the foundation necessary to craft new U.S. desertion and nonsupport laws in the
1870s and 1880s.26 By 1886, eleven states had created a criminal offense for a father to abandon or refuse to support his minor children.27 These statutes sought to address a social problem—the poverty plaguing single mothers and their children—
while simultaneously limiting public welfare expenses.28 Ultimately, state legislatures used these statutes to articulate their

21. See id. at 1137.
22. See id. at 1142.
23. 3 Day 37, 56 (Conn. 1808) (holding that Eunice Stanton could recover
from her ex-husband, the father of her three children, after her second husband died); see id. (“By the divorce the relation of husband and wife was destroyed; but not the relation between [the husband] and his children. His duty
and liability, as to them, remained the same . . . .”).
24. 13 Johns. Ch. 480, 480 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). The court held that a father
had no duty to reimburse a shopkeeper for a coat which his son purchased using his father’s credit and without his permission. Id. The father had not neglected his duties to provide “necessaries” for his son. Id. Therefore, the shopkeeper had extended credit at his own peril. Id.
25. See Hansen, supra note 8, at 1136.
26. See id. at 1147.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1135.
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strong desire to prevent women and children’s dependency on
the welfare state.29
B. CHILDREN DISABLED BEFORE REACHING THE AGE OF
MAJORITY
English common law placed no duty on parents to provide
continuing support to their adult children, regardless of disability. Blackstone, however, argued that “no person is bound to
provide [a] maintenance for his issue,” “unless where the children are impotent, either through infancy, disease or accident.”30 The Elizabethan Poor Laws reflected his views,
obligating families to accept responsibility for their disabled
relatives for three generations.31
Although historically most states did not require parents to
provide for their disabled children into adulthood, some jurisdictions began to recognize such a duty in the early twentieth
century.32 In Crain v. Mallone, the court reasoned that since an
adult disabled child was as helpless and dependent upon his
parents as an infant, his parents had an obligation to continue
providing for his care.33 In subsequent decisions, courts invoked
natural law to designate parents as best suited to maintain the
“wants and weaknesses” of their children.34
Courts relied on statutes criminalizing a parent’s failure to
support his child to extend a parent’s duty beyond the disabled

29. See id. at 1148–49.
30. Stanton v. Wilson, 3 Day 37, 58 (Conn. 1808) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 7, at 437).
31. See Quigley, supra note 10 (“‘[T]he father and grandfather, and the
mother and grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, lame and
impotent person, or other poor person not able to work . . . [were to] relieve
and maintain’ their relatives.” (quoting Relief of the Poor Act, 1601, 43 Eliz.,
c. 2, § 7 (Eng.), reprinted in 7 Stat. 30 (1762)) (alteration in original)).
32. See Amy P. Hauser, Note, Child Custody for Disabled Adults: What
Kentucky Families Need, 91 KY. L.J. 667, 669 (2002); Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to Support Child,
48 A.L.R. 4th 919 passim (2003).
33. 113 S.W. 67 (Ky. 1908); see also id. at 68 (“[W]e see no difference in
principle between the duty imposed upon the parent to support the infant and
the obligation to care for the adult, who is equally, if not more, dependant
upon the parent.”).
34. See Hauser, supra note 32, at 670 (“[T]he wants and weaknesses of
children render it necessary that some person maintains them, and the voice
of nature has pointed out the parent as the most fit and proper person.” (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 190 (13th ed. 1884))).
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child’s minority.35 Under these statutes, courts generally measured the duty of continuing support by assessing each party’s
financial conditions.36 If a child was totally without resources,
the parents’ obligation to provide support depended upon their
own financial circumstances.37 Courts expected parents to contribute only the amount necessary to keep the child from destitution and excused from their legal duty parents who did not
have the ability to pay.38
In the absence of statutory support, courts found a continuing duty of parental support in case law.39 In Borchert v. Borchert, the court noted this trend, observing that “[t]he doctrine
of liability in a father to support an incapacitated adult child
seems to have permeated the courts of this country, in many
cases without any statutory enactment to support it.”40 To find
such a duty, courts often employed statutes applicable to minor
children under the theory that continuing disability prevented
the child from becoming emancipated and that the disabled
adult therefore remained a child in the eyes of the law.41
C. CHILDREN DISABLED POST MAJORITY
Courts split on the question of whether a parent was obligated to support an adult disabled child if the disability arose
after he or she reached the legal age of emancipation. In Kruvant v. Kruvant, for example, the court noted that “[n]ormal instincts of humanity and plain common sense” dictated an obligation of parental support, which should continue until the
need terminated.42 The Kruvant court then concluded that this
35. See id. at 669–70.
36. See Harlow, supra note 32, at 922.
37. See id. (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Cal. 48, 56 (1899)).
38. See id.
39. See Hauser, supra note 32, at 670 (noting that it became a “trend” for
courts to find a parental duty to adult disabled children).
40. 45 A.2d 463, 465 (Md. 1946) (“The obligation is set out in a great many
cases . . . . In some cases the basis of the liability is lack of emancipation. In
others it is stated to be the moral duty and it is indicated that the legal duty
follows the moral duty . . . . [I]n view of the many decisions so holding . . .
there is now a tendency in this country . . . to recognize a duty imposed upon a
parent to support his incapacitated child.”), superseded by statute, MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-101 (West 2006), as recognized in Freeburger v. Bichell,
763 A.2d 1226 (2000).
41. See Harlow, supra note 32, at 921 (citing Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290
(1868)).
42. 241 A.2d 259 (N.J. 1968); see also id. at 265–66 (holding that a father
did not have a duty to provide continuing support for his son, who after reach-
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duty did not extend to children who were not disabled or were
capable of supporting themselves at the time they reached majority.43 In Mount Pleasant v. Wilcox, the court similarly held
that a father’s legal duty to support his daughter ended once
she reached the age of majority without disability and that a
subsequent change in her condition did not restore his duty.44
Other courts, however, concluded that parents were morally and therefore legally obligated to support such children. In
Burrill v. Sermini, for example, the court held a father liable to
the state for support of his daughter, who was committed to a
mental hospital as an adult.45 The court held that a poor law
statute, applying to “kindred bound by law,” obliged the father
to provide support, even though his daughter was a married
adult at the time her disability arose.46 Similarly, in Commonwealth ex rel. O’Malley v. O’Malley, the Court held that a general child support statute that did not distinguish between disabled adult or minor children applied to a parent whose child
became disabled after reaching majority.47
D. RECENT HISTORY
In 1966, New York became one of the first states to repeal
its statute imposing parental liability for support of disabled
individuals over the age of majority.48 The change reflected an
emerging recognition of a more generalized interdependence
among society’s members.49 In the late 1960s through the
ing majority had his own apartment, traveled to Europe, and held at least two
jobs before developing a mental disability).
43. Id.
44. 2 Pa. D. 628 (D. & C. 1893) (holding that a father was not liable to
support his adult daughter who suffered a mental breakdown); see also Harlow, supra note 32, at 926 (citing Wilcox).
45. 118 N.E. 331, 332 (Mass. 1918).
46. See id. (“It is not probable that the legislature intended the liability of
parents should terminate on the marriage of their children when they were
made liable for the support of the grandchildren.”).
47. 161 A. 883, 884–85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932) (“The presumption undoubtedly is that when the child comes of age, the reciprocal duties between father
and child are at an end, but such presumption is overcome where conditions
show that either party is incapable of self-support.”).
48. See Julianne Sartain, Probate Code Section 15306: Discretionary
Trusts as a Financial Solution for the Disabled, 37 UCLA L. REV. 595, 606
(1990) (referring to a California statute imposing familial liability for the support of the adult disabled as being an “especially outdated notion of financial
responsibility”).
49. See id. at 606–07 (“These far reaching limitations on the financial responsibility of relatives for support of the needy will lift an often heavy burden
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1970s, Congress also began to recognize the right of disabled
citizens to participate in society and passed federal legislation
that mobilized social, as opposed to familial, resources to effectuate that right.50 The United Nations even declared 1983
through 1992 the “Decade of Disabled Persons.”51
This apparent commitment to the societal care and protection for the disabled, however, did not fully displace prior notions of familial responsibility. More recently, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) mandated “sweeping changes in several of the laws
regulating the poor,”52 aimed in part at reducing societal responsibility for supporting dependent children.53 Reminiscent
of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, PRWORA reform left government responsibility for the poor at the local level and reintroon those obligated to pay for assistance under existing State laws. Experience
has shown that the financial responsibility of a broad class of relatives, imposed by statute, is more often a destructive rather than cohesive, factor in
family unity.” (citing Jones v. Jones, 51 Misc. 2d 610, 613 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1966))).
50. See Charles D. Siegal, Fifty Years of Disability Law: The Relevance of
the Universal Declaration, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 271 (1999)
(discussing the following three acts at the national level: “(1) The
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968: Requires new federal buildings and those
constructed with federal funds to be accessible; (2) Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
Makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of disability in any US government-funded program or activity; and (3) Education of All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975” (citation omitted)).
51. See id. at 272–73 (“¶ D. 1983–1992: United Nations Decade of Disabled Persons. The United Nations began a significant effort directed to a
range of projects involving disabilities. It culminated in several significant
documents in the area; ¶ E. 1984: Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and
Disability; ¶ F. 1987: United Nations rejected proposed Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Disabled Persons; ¶ G.
1989: Convention on the Rights of the Child; ¶ H. 1989: Tallinn Guidelines for
Action on Human Resources Development in the Field of Disability were set
into place as well; and ¶ I. 1991: General Assembly adopted the Principles for
the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of
Mental Health Care.” (citation omitted)).
52. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 111 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
(West 1997)); see Quigley, supra note 10, at 101–02.
53. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; see
also Hansen, supra note 8, at 1123 (demonstrating bipartisan support for the
PRWORA, stating, “Representative Jennifer Dunn pointed out that nonpayment of child support was a major cause of welfare dependency” and asking,
“What happens when that money is not paid? The children and the mother go
on welfare. And so the taxpayer becomes in effect the parent of those children”
(quoting The Welfare Bill: The Republicans’ View, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at
A25)).
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duced the concept of multi-generational family responsibility.54
Because society viewed non-payment of child support as a major cause of welfare dependency, states strengthened child support enforcement. Congress emphasized familial responsibility
by giving states the option to bring an action for support
against a child’s grandparents in limited circumstances.55
In August 1996 Congress began to restrict access to Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The definition of disability for
SSI purposes was changed to make it “much more difficult for
disabled children to qualify for benefits.”56 To save federal
funds, the PRWORA relied on the private family as the social
institution capable of rectifying inevitable dependency. The Act
treated resort to the state as a failure. PRWORA’s apparent acceptance of the principle that society should not be financially
responsible for individuals who have relatives to support them
reversed an earlier acceptance of collective responsibility for
the disabled.
Consistent with PRWORA, many state courts continue to
recognize a duty of parents to support mentally or physically
disabled adult children. Jurisdictions base liability for an adult
child incapable of self-maintenance on common law, statute, or
contractual duties.57 Frequently, courts will imply this duty as
a means to reimburse the state for the cost of hospitalization.
Courts also commonly employ this duty in child support proceedings, in which the custodial parent seeks continued payments for a disabled adult from the non-custodial parent. The
next section examines the current state of the law across the
United States in greater detail.
II. CURRENT STATE LAW
Laws that impose a duty to support adult disabled children
are potentially relevant to a broad class of Americans, as nearly
54. See Quigley, supra note 10, at 106.
55. See id. at 102 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(18) (West 1997)).
56. See id. (“The Act changes eligibility from the lenient ‘comparable severity’ standard . . . to the more narrow standard where an individual under
the age of 18 shall be considered disabled for purposes of this title if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which
results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (West 1997))).
57. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Parent’s Obligation to Support Adult
Child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910, § 5 (1948).
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one-third of families include at least one disabled member.58
States use three very different approaches to determine
whether parents have a duty to support their adult disabled
children. Not surprisingly, all states have statutes requiring
parents to support their children until they reach the age of
majority (eighteen or nineteen) or graduate from high school,
whichever comes first.59 Beyond this basic requirement, however, states differ. The first group follows the common law rule
that does not extend a parent’s duty beyond the child’s minority, regardless of existing or subsequent disabilities. A second
group holds parents liable for their adult child’s support if the
disability arose before the child’s majority. Finally, a third
group dictates that parents have a duty to support their adult
disabled child regardless of whether the disability arose prior
or subsequent to the age of majority.
A. STATES NOT RECOGNIZING A DUTY TO SUPPORT AFTER
MAJORITY OR EMANCIPATION
Many parents are likely unaware of the possibility that the
state may legally obligate them to support their children
throughout adulthood. Surprisingly, however, only nine states
follow the traditional common law rule that a parent’s duty to
support his or her child ends once that child reaches majority
or is otherwise emancipated.60 In these nine states, families decide whether and on what conditions they should continue to
support their disabled child beyond majority or, in cases where
disability arises post-majority, whether support should resume.
The statutes and common law of these states reflect a purposeful “hands-off ” approach.61 Most of these states’ laws clearly

58. Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA’s “Major
Life Activity” Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 188 (1999) (explaining that 29.2% of American families have at least one disabled family
member).
59. Laura Wish Morgan, The Duty to Support Adult Disabled Children,
DIVORCE LITIG., Oct. 1997, at 185, available at http://www
.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art200003.html.
60. The nine states are: Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See infra note
61.
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2006 (2003);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (2005);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(6) (2004); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (Gould 1999);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2 (2003); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 767.25(4) (West 2001).
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and concisely terminate parents’ legal duty to their child, regardless of disability, once that child reaches majority.62
As mentioned, New York specifically amended its child
support laws in 1966 to relieve parents of legal support obligations beyond a child’s twenty-first birthday, even if the child is
disabled.63 The New York legislature made this change out of
the perception that the prior law had a destructive effect on the
family unit by placing a heavy and sometimes unmanageable
burden on families.64 Following the 1966 amendment, the New
York Supreme Court confirmed that absent an agreement to
the contrary, no statutory authority legally compels a parent to
provide financial support to a physically or mentally disabled
child over the age of twenty-one years, no matter when the disability arises.65 The court emphasized that the amended statutes no longer provide any exception for disabled children, and,
in fact, specifically eliminated any such exception so as to
transfer the parental burden to the state.66
In absence of a statute explicitly on point, Nebraska courts
have interpreted related statutory provisions in a manner consistent with the common law. While Nebraska’s statutes give
courts power to compel parents to support minors, they are silent as to children who have reached the age of majority. The
Nebraska Supreme Court has reasoned that this silence just as
clearly confers no authority to compel direct support of adult
children. As a result, Nebraska law, thus construed, does not
compel support of an adult child who is disabled.67
States following this approach are:
Georgia: Parents have no duty to support an adult disabled
child beyond the age of majority.68
Kansas: Parents have no statutory or common law duty to
support their adult children.69
Montana: A parent is not obligated to support an eighteenyear-old or otherwise emancipated child.70
62. See supra note 61.
63. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415.
64. Id.
65. Beiter v. Beiter, 539 N.Y.S.2d 271, 271 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
66. Id. at 272–73.
67. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(6) (2004); Meyers v. Meyers, 383 N.W.2d
784, 789 (Neb. 1986).
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (2004).
69. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2006 (2003).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(5) (2005).
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Nebraska: According to common law, parents are not obligated to support their adult disabled children.71
New York: The New York legislature specifically amended
child support laws in 1966 to eliminate parental obligation to
support children, including those who are disabled, after the
child’s twenty-first birthday.72 The legislature changed the laws
because such support often placed a heavy burden on families,
and this burden was more often destructive to the family unit
than cohesive.73
North Dakota: Any order requiring parents to support
children ends when the child graduates high school or reaches
majority, whichever occurs first.74
Rhode Island: Courts may order support until the child’s
twenty-first birthday, regardless of disability.75
Wisconsin: Parents have no duty to support any child who
has reached majority.76
B. STATES REQUIRING A CONTINUING SUPPORT DUTY IF
DISABILITY ONSET WAS PRIOR TO MAJORITY OR EMANCIPATION
When a child becomes disabled prior to emancipation, his
parents may expect that he will not be able to support himself
as an adult. As a result, parents may be willing and prepared
to continue their support into adulthood. However, the second
groups of states—nearly half of all states—make the duty to
provide continuing support to an adult disabled child legally
compulsory.77 The laws of these states compel parents with dis-

71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-664(6).
72. See Jones v. Jones, 51 Misc. 2d 610, 615 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1966) (“I find
that under the new law, the father of a child over the age of 21 has no continuing responsibility for support of that child, regardless of the circumstances or
of the fact that there is or was an existing order of this court for such support.”).
73. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (Gould 1999) (“[T]here are and probably
always will be many other cases in which continued support by a parent may
be a very taxing and sometimes relationship-destroying experience. It is not
the function of this court to decide upon what the public policy of the State
shall be. That is the function and prerogative of the Legislature, which in its
wisdom, adopted this change.”).
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004).
75. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2 (2003).
76. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.25(4) (West 2001).
77. The twenty-four states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
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abled children incapable of self-support to continue their support post-majority. In these states, this duty only applies when
children are disabled prior to the age of emancipation. Children
who have reached majority become fully emancipated from
their parents, and a subsequent disability will not resurrect a
parental duty.
These states contend that duties growing out of the relation between parents and their minor children should not
automatically terminate at the child’s majority, when such duty
still exists in the forum of conscience.78 The presumption that a
parent’s duties end when the child reaches majority is overcome if (a) the child is incapable of earning a livelihood, and (b)
the parent has the ability to provide assistance. Humanity recognizes that this duty should exist; therefore, these states impose a legal duty by statute or common law.79 By having parents maintain responsibilities they have already undertaken,
these states expect to prevent the public from being saddled
with the financial burden of supporting these people with disabilities.
The state statutes addressing a parent’s continuing duty
apply only when the courts extend a current order or when the
disability arose prior to the child’s majority.80 For example,
Colorado’s statute mandates that, “If a child is physically or
mentally incapable of self-support when he attains the age of
majority, emancipation does not occur, and the duty of parental
support continues for the duration of the child’s disability.”81
vania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
See infra note 80.
78. E.g., Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs. v. C.R., 720 A.2d 1004,
1012–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
79. See, e.g., id.
80. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140(a)(3)
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320B (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12312(a)(5)(B) (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(1.5)(a)(II) (2005); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-215a (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (West 2005); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18 (LexisNexis 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 405.020 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125B.110 (LexisNexis
2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-3 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.86 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 45, § 112.1A (West 2006); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (West 2001);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-61 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-1, 48-11-103 (West 2006); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-204(a) (2005).
81. In re Marriage of Cropper, 895 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995)
(“[Section 14-10-115(1.5)(a)(II)] provides that emancipation occurs and an order for child support terminates when a child attains nineteen years of age,
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The Colorado court in Koltay v. Koltay held that, under this
law, if the child is incapable of self-support, the child is not
“emancipated,” despite the presumption that twenty-one is the
age of emancipation.82 A different interpretation would be
wholly inconsistent with the independence that the word
emancipation connotes.83 Thus, if a child is physically or mentally incapable of self-support when he attains the age of majority, emancipation does not occur, and the duty of parental support continues for the duration of the child’s disability.84
Further, the Colorado court in In re Marriage of Cropper ordered ongoing support for a mentally disabled child who could
maintain a job at a supermarket, but required ongoing assistance and thus the child could not be emancipated.85
A similar Pennsylvania statute imposes a parental duty of
support if the disability prevents the child from achieving selfsufficiency and the child’s disability arose prior to attaining
majority.86 In line with the Colorado statute, the inability to
self-support prevents the child’s emancipation.87 The parent’s
moral duty to care for the child forms the basis for the continuing duty.88 The test to determine a parent’s obligation considers
whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in
profitable employment and whether employment is available to
that child at a supporting wage.89 Thus, even if a mentally or
physically disabled child is employable, she is still entitled to
support if she is incapable of complete self-support.90
Florida’s statute allows the court to require “support for a
dependant person beyond the age of 18 years when such dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which
began prior to such person reaching majority.”91 Florida’s
courts have strictly maintained the “prior to reaching majority”
unless the child is then mentally or physically disabled. And, if a child is
physically or mentally incapable of self-support upon attaining majority at age
twenty-one, the duty of parental support continues for the duration of the disability.” (citing Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1983))).
82. Koltay, 667 P.2d at 1375–76.
83. Id. at 1376.
84. Id.
85. In re Marriage of Cropper, 895 P.2d at 1158.
86. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (West 2001).
87. Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1214–15.
90. Id.
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (West 2005).
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provision in the statute. In one case, the court denied a
mother’s request to obtain child support for her mentally disabled child because she did not file the request before her child
achieved majority.92 The court found that it had no jurisdiction
to allow the mother’s request,93 but the legislature did allow
the disabled child to request support from his father directly,
and the statute permitted the disabled child to bring a claim
against his parents at any time, so long as the disability existed
prior to majority.94
Along these same lines, the plain language of Alabama’s
statute does not expressly exclude adult disabled children from
receiving support.95 The applicable case law has interpreted
“child” to include adult disabled children who are unable to
support themselves,96 and the Alabama Supreme Court has established a parent’s “duty . . . to support [his or her] children
who continue to be disabled beyond their minority.”97
Other statutes, including Indiana’s, use slightly different
wording and require parents to support their children until age
twenty-one,98 but provide exceptions for equitable reasons or
for reasons in the best interest of the child.99 These types of
statutes provide the court with more discretion when determining whether to extend support beyond the date of majority.
Still more states recognize the duty to support adult disabled children only at common law.100 Following a common law
exception, these states recognize that a duty to support a child
continues into the child’s adulthood if that child was disabled
prior to reaching majority. New Mexico courts, for example, imposed a common law duty to continue support for adult dis92. Brown v. Brown, 714 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
93. Id. at 476.
94. Hastings v. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
95. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998).
96. See, e.g., DeMo v. DeMo, 679 So. 2d 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
97. Ex parte Brewington, 445 So. 2d 294, 297 (Ala. 1983).
98. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18 (LexisNexis 2003).
99. Id. § 32-14-11-18(2) (“[The duty to support continues until the age of
twenty-one unless the] child is incapacitated. If this occurs, the child support
continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court.”); id. § 3116-6-2 (describing the contents of a child support and educational support order).
100. Feinberg v. Diamant, 389 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. 1979); Blakley v.
Blakley, 549 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1996), rev’g 534 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995); Cohn v. Cohn, 934 P.2d 279, 281 (N.M. 1996); Rowell v. Town of Vershire, 19 A. 990, 990 (Vt. 1890); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 204 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1978).
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abled children until the need for support ceases. The appellate
court in Cohn v. Cohn remarked that “evolving common law
[holds] that where a child is of weak body or mind, unable to
care for himself after coming of age, the parent’s duty to support the child continues as before and ceases only when the necessity for support ceases.”101 The theory “that the continuing
‘disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated’ forms
the basis of this exception, and because he is incapable of
emancipation, he remains a minor in the eyes of the law.”102
Further, the court determined that there is nothing in the
statutory scheme to indicate any legislative intent to eliminate
this common law rule.103
Massachusetts also recognizes the duty to support adult
disabled children only at common law. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Feinberg v. Diamant held that “a financially
able divorced parent may be required to contribute to the support of an adult child who by reason of mental or physical infirmity incurs expenses that he or she is unable to meet.”104
However, because Massachusetts’ statutory law does not impose this burden,105 the court imposes the duty only under its
general equity powers and in cases concerning the guardianship of incompetents.106
Operating under the theory that a child disabled prior to
reaching majority cannot become emancipated, these states require a parent’s duty to his or her adult child to continue only
when the disability arose prior to the child’s majority. Whether
governed by statute or common law, these states recognize that
this duty should continue for both humanitarian and equitable
reasons. As such, these states expect a parent to continue supporting an adult disabled child since the parent already
undertook that duty during the child’s minority.
States following this approach are:
Alabama: The laws of Alabama do not expressly exclude
adult disabled children from receiving support.107 The Alabama
101. 934 P.2d at 280 (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 103
(1987)).
102. Id. at 280 (quoting Harlow, supra note 32, at 923) (citing N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4-7(B)(3)).
103. Id. at 281.
104. Feinberg, 389 N.E.2d at 1001.
105. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 2006).
106. Feinberg, 389 N.E.2d at 1002.
107. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (LexisNexis 1998).
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Supreme Court has established that it is a parent’s “duty. . . to
support [his or her] children who continue to be disabled beyond their minority.”108
Alaska: The Alaska Supreme Court held that the parental
duty of support to continue beyond the age of majority where
an adult child is incapable of supporting him- or herself by reason of a physical or mental disability.109
Arizona: Courts may order support to continue past the age
of majority in the case of a mentally or physically disabled
child.110
Arkansas: Courts may order continuation of support even
after a disabled child reaches majority.111
Colorado: “If a child is physically or mentally incapable of
self-support when he attains the age of majority, emancipation
does not occur, and the duty of parental support continues for
the duration of the child’s disability.”112
Connecticut: State statutory law requires parents to support their children until the children reach age of majority
(eighteen years of age).113
Florida: Under state statute, both parents have the duty of
support when the disability began prior to child’s majority.114
Indiana: The child must be disabled at the time the child
reaches the age of majority for a support duty to be imposed.115
Kentucky: The support duty extends only to those children
who are mentally or physically incapacitated upon reaching the
age of majority.116
Massachusetts: Massachusetts recognizes the continuing
duty to support adult disabled children only at common law.117
Michigan: The Supreme Court of Michigan appears to have
recognized a common law continuing duty of support in excep-

108. Ex parte Brewington, 445 So. 2d 294, 297 (Ala. 1983).
109. Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 800 (Alaska 1989).
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320E3 (2004).
111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312(a)(5)(B) (2002).
112. Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Colo. 1983); see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-115(1.5)(a) (2005).
113. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1d (2004).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07(2) (West 2005).
115. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-11-18 (LexisNexis 2003).
116. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.020 (LexisNexis 2004).
117. Feinberg v. Diamant, 389 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. 1979).
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tional circumstances, but the language of the opinion on point
is not specific.118
Nevada: “The handicap of the child must have occurred before the age of majority for this duty to apply.”119
New Jersey: The New Jersey Supreme Court held: A parent is required to support his or her children until they are
emancipated. When the child suffers from a disability, emancipation does not occur automatically upon reaching the age of
majority. The court must determine that the fundamental parent and child relationship has concluded.120
New Mexico: The court recognizes the common law duty to
continue support for an adult disabled child until the need for
support ceases.121
North Carolina: Parents are required to support their children only if the children are disabled upon reaching majority.122
Ohio: The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that that “a
domestic relations court has jurisdiction to order a noncustodial
parent to continue to provide support after the age of majority
if the child is physically or mentally disabled to the extent of
being incapable of maintaining himself or herself.”123
Oklahoma: A court may order support for an adult disabled
child if the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is
known to exist, on or before the child’s eighteenth birthday.124
Pennsylvania: “Parents may be liable for the support of
their children who are 18 years of age or older.”125 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has construed the statute to require
parents to support their child if the child’s physical or mental

118. See Blakley v. Blakley, 549 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1996).
119. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125B.110 (LexisNexis 2004).
120. Monmouth County Div. of Soc. Servs. v. C.R., 720 A.2d 1004, 1013–14
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (“Defendant’s limited, but voluntary, financial
involvements in meeting his son’s need is really the affirmative of what was
always his fundamental duty, even in the presence of a concurrent role required or permitted of public authorities.”).
121. Cohn v. Cohn, 934 P.2d 279, 281 (N.M. 1996) (“We join the majority of
jurisdictions that hold that parents have a common-law continuing duty to
support a severely disabled child if, as in this case, the child was so disabled
before reaching the age of majority.”).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8 (2005).
123. Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ohio 1984).
124. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 112.1A (West 2006).
125. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4321(3) (West 2001).
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disability existed when he reached majority and prevents him
from being self-supporting.126
Texas: Parents are obligated to support their adult disabled children who were disabled prior to attaining majority.127
Vermont: The court in Rowell v. Town of Vershire stated
that at common law, parents owe a duty of support that terminates when a child reaches majority. However, an exception exists for those children who are disabled and unable to support
themselves. For those children, the parents’ duty of support
continues beyond the child’s minority.128
Virginia: A court may order continued support for a disabled child who is unable to support himself, unable to live independently, and resides with his parent.129
Washington: Statutory language suggests that a court may
order continued support of an adult disabled child if the court
determines that the child is dependent on the parents, taking
into consideration the child’s disability.130
West Virginia: A court may order support for an adult disabled child, provided that the child is unmarried, insolvent, and
residing with a parent, so long as the child was not emancipated at the time the disability occurred, and regardless of
whether the disability occurred before or after the age of majority.131
Wyoming: Parents have a duty to support a disabled child
when the disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated, regardless of the age of the child.132
C. STATES RECOGNIZING A SUPPORT DUTY NO MATTER WHEN
THE DISABILITY ARISES
Parents of children with no known disability generally assume their children will support themselves as adults. Many
parents may not be aware of what may happen if their children
become disabled as adults. For this reason, learning that over
one-third of all states recognize a parental legal duty to support

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).
Rowell v. Town of Vershire, 19 A. 990, 990 (Vt. 1890).
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (2004); § 20-124.2(C) (2004 & Supp. 2006).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.002, 26.08.004 (West 2006).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-103(a)–(b), 2-3-1 (West 2006).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-204(a) (2005).
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an adult disabled child,133 regardless of the timing of the disability’s onset, shocks most parents. In other words, once a
child reaches majority and becomes emancipated, a subsequently arising disability can revive the parental duty of support. Courts upholding this revived duty note that parents have
a compelling moral duty to care for their adult disabled children and conclude, as a matter of public policy, that society
should not be financially responsible for individuals with relatives capable of supporting them. On this basis, courts impose a
continuing and revived duty on parents to support their adult
disabled children.134
Support requirements and justifications vary somewhat
within this group. A majority of these states have passed statutes confirming a parent’s duty to support an adult disabled
child, while other states impose the duty via an existing Poor
Person Statute. These statutes tend to have very clear, concise
language that leaves little room for judicial discretion to negate
the duty to support adult disabled children.135
For example, California’s statute mandates that “parents
have a duty to maintain . . . a child of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient
means.”136 In Woolams v. Woolams, a California appellate court
held that a father had a duty to support his adult child who became physically disabled after majority.137 Though the adult
child’s mother devoted all her time and resources to caring for
the child, the court determined that the father was “capable of

133. The eighteen states are: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah. See
infra note 135. The District of Columbia also recognizes this duty. Id.
134. Woolams v. Woolams, 251 P.2d 392, 395 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952);
Sayne v. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d 309, 310–12 (Tenn. 1955).
135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503
(1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1993 & Supp. 2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/513 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(9) (West
2001); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13102(b) (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. § 518.57 (2004); Act of May 31, 2006,
ch. 280, § 518.54, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 15 (West) (to be codified at
MINN. STAT. § 518.54); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 109.010 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(17) (1985 & Supp. 2005);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-2, 78-45-3(1), 78-45-4(1) (2002).
136. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910(a).
137. Woolams v. Woolams, 251 P.2d 392, 395–96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
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earning an income sufficient to enable himself to pay.”138 The
court determined that the father could and should be compelled
to aid in his daughter’s care, thus reviving his parental care
duty.139
The court ultimately based its decision on a reference to
section of 206 of the California Civil Code—now section 3910 of
the California Family Code—requiring a parent to maintain a
child who cannot maintain himself.140 This section “provides
that it is the duty of the parent to support the child to the extent
of his ability” in order to protect the public from the burden of
supporting a person who has a parent able to support him.141
When considering the parents’ ability to pay, the court acknowledged the danger of “the end result [being] two persons
for the people to support rather than one,” and remarked that,
“It seems harsh that a man 63 years of age should be required
to use up his life’s earnings, if necessary to support his child,
and thereby leave himself no cushion to fall back upon, for the
years not too distant when he will have very little, if any, earning ability. Before that cushion should be reduced substantially, however, it would seem that the needs of the child must
be pared down to a minimum.”142
The court further stated that under this type of support order, like any child support order, the court retains jurisdiction.143 Thus, if the parent’s circumstances change such that he
or she faces an intolerable burden in maintaining the support,
the court can modify the order accordingly. There is nothing final about the award.144 Ultimately, the resurrected duty places
the burden of support on the parents in order to protect the
public, but it is not meant to impose an undue hardship on the
parents if they cannot afford the burden themselves.
Case law in other states interpreting statutes like California’s is consistent with this public policy theory. New Hampshire has a statute that mandates that “[e]very person whose
income or other resources are more than sufficient to provide
for his or her reasonable subsistence compatible with decency
or health owes a duty to support or contribute to the support of
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 395 (citation omitted).
Id. at 396.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910.
Woolams, 251 P.2d at 396.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395–96.
See Paxton v. Paxton, 89 P. 1083, 1085 (Cal. 1907).
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his or her wife, husband, child, father or mother when in
need.”145 In Delaware’s Poor Person Statute, a parent may be
ordered to provide support for an adult child who is unable to
provide for himself.146 The legislative purpose of this statute is
“to make designated relatives liable for an indigent’s support to
avoid the use of public funds.”147
Courts also tend to look to the legislative intent of the
statute, reasoning that where no reference to the time of the
occurrence of the disability is made in the statute, no distinction exists. In Sininger v. Sininger, a Maryland court held that
a parent who has the means also has the duty to support an
adult disabled child regardless of the time of the onset of the
disability.148 The court reasoned that the statute itself makes
no distinction based on emancipation, and therefore concluding
that the duty applied only when the disability began prior to
emancipation would frustrate the legislative intent. The court
found any distinction based on the timing of the disability’s onset is irrelevant.149
Further, some states follow the humanitarian rule that
parents should support their adult disabled children because
the need for support exists and the dictates of humanity requiring parents to support their children before majority should
also continue thereafter. Tennessee and South Dakota courts
provide that parents owe a duty of support to their adult disabled children because these children are as helpless as infants.150 If the children have the same needs for support after
attaining majority as they did before, the parent’s rights and
duties to the child should not change.151 This approach suggests
that, although Tennessee has no statute mandating that a parent support his or her adult disabled child, the discretion of the
court clearly leans in that direction, allowing resurrection of a
parent’s duty even after the child has reached majority.152 And,
although South Dakota’s statutes do not provide the court with
authority or discretion to extend support beyond the child’s age
145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006).
146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 (1999).
147. Helen B.M. v. Samuel F.D., 479 A.2d 852, 855 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1984).
148. 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (Md. 1984).
149. Id. at 1357.
150. Mower v. Mower, 199 N.W. 42, 42 (S.D. 1924); Sayne v. Sayne, 284
S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tenn. 1955).
151. Mower, 199 N.W. at 42; Sayne, 284 S.W.2d at 311.
152. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d at 311–12.
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of majority,153 the court has chosen to extend the duty nonetheless.154
In yet another approach, Idaho and the District of Columbia impose a statutory duty on living relatives to pay for the
costs of care when a mentally ill relative has been committed to
a state facility.155 These laws recognize a duty to support adult
disabled children only at common law, but add the statutory
burden for such limited circumstances in order to reduce the financial burden on society.
Thus these states resurrect the parental duty of support
even when the disability arises long after the child has passed
the age of majority. This final group of states, imposing a duty
on parents regardless of the onset of disability, consists of:
California: Parents have a duty to maintain a child of any
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means.156
Delaware: Under Delaware’s Poor Person Statute, a parent
may be ordered to provide child support for an adult child who
is unable to provide for himself.157 The purpose of this statute
is to avoid using state resources to support the child.
District of Columbia: The District of Columbia recognizes a
duty to support adult disabled children only at common law.158
However, relatives (the “father, mother, husband, wife and
adult children”) have a statutory obligation to support a mentally ill person hospitalized in a state facility.159
Hawaii: A statute imposes an obligation on parents to support an adult disabled child.160
Idaho: Common law imposes a duty on parents to care for
their adult disabled children only if the children are already
suffering from a mental or physical disability when they
achieve majority. However, if a relative is hospitalized in a
state facility, parents have a statutory obligation to support the
child.161
153. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.1 (2004).
154. Mower, 199 N.W. at 42.
155. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-586, 16-916 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2006);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-354 (2000).
156. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004).
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503 (1999).
158. Nelson v. Nelson, 548 A.2d 109, 111 (D.C. 1988).
159. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.
160. HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1993 & Supp. 2005).
161. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-354 (2000).

BUHAI_4FMT

2007]

2/16/2007 10:00:58 AM

CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

735

Illinois: Parents have a duty to support their adult children
suffering from a mental or physical incapacity.162
Iowa: Iowa imposes a statutory duty on parents to support
their adult disabled children.163
Louisiana: Louisiana imposes a statutory duty on parents
to support their adult disabled children.164
Maine: Baril v. Baril, a 1976 case relying on a repealed
statute, states that a parent is obligated to support his or her
adult disabled child.165 Though that case appears to be good
law, the current statutes are somewhat unclear as to this issue.
Maryland: Maryland common law and statutory law impose a duty on parents to support their adult disabled children.166
Minnesota: Minnesota imposes a statutory duty on parents
to support their adult disabled children, and acknowledges a
common law duty to do so.167
Mississippi: Statutory law does not impose a legal obligation on parents to support their adult disabled children, but
common law recognizes an enforceable duty to do so.168
Missouri: There is no reason to impose a legal obligation to
support one’s infant child but not an adult disabled child who is
just as helpless and dependent on the parent for care.169 If the
child is physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting
himself, and if the child is also insolvent and unmarried, the
court may extend the parental support obligation past the
child’s eighteenth birthday.170
New Hampshire: The court may order support past the age
of majority for a disabled child if it is extending a current order.171 However, the state’s Poor Person Statute, which requires that, if a person has sufficient means, he or she must
support “his or her wife, husband, child, father or mother when

162. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/513 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
163. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1(9) (West 2001).
164. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (1993).
165. 354 A.2d 392 (Me. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1504 (1998).
166. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
167. MINN. STAT. § 518.57 (2004); Act of May 31, 2006, ch. 280, § 518.54,
2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 15 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 518.54).
168. Watkins v. Watkins, 337 So. 2d 723, 724–25 (Miss. 1976).
169. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Mo. App. 1958).
170. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
171. Smith v. Stilphen, 344 F. Supp. 2d 794, 797–98 (D.N.H. 2004).
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in need,” would compel a revival of support duties for an adult
disabled child.172
Oregon: “Parents are bound to maintain their children who
are poor and unable to work to maintain themselves.”173 Nature
imposes a duty of child support for adult disabled children.
South Carolina: Courts may order parents to support their
adult disabled children because such support is in the best interest of the children and the state, and it is conducive to the
welfare of the family.174
South Dakota: Statutes do not provide the court with authority or discretion to extend support beyond the age of majority.175 However, courts may order parents to support their adult
disabled children because the children are as helpless and incapable as infants.176
Tennessee: Parents owe a duty of support to their adult
disabled children because the children are as helpless as infants and because the children may have the same needs of
support after attaining majority as before. Therefore, a parent’s
rights and duties to the child should not change.177
Utah: Parents may be ordered to support their adult disabled children so as not to burden the public.178
III. MORAL DUTIES
Our general intuition tells us that parents should support
their adult disabled children in many, if not most, situations.
This section examines this intuition and where it comes from.
Moral duties are the set of duties we owe to others and “are designed to check our merely self-interested, emotional, or sentimental reactions to serious questions of human conduct.”179
Society has transformed moral duties into rules as a means of
encouraging people to cooperate.180 Given the diversity of American culture and its varied religious and philosophical traditions, many forces interconnect to instill moral duties in par172. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006).
173. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.010 (West 2003).
174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(17) (1985 & Supp. 2005).
175. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.1 (2004).
176. Mower v. Mower, 199 N.W. 42, 42 (S.D. 1924).
177. Sayne v. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d 309, 311–12 (Tenn. 1955).
178. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-2, -3(1), -4(1) (2002).
179. See Richard Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (1998).
180. Id. at 1687.
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ents to care for their children. Even basic social structures,
such as the American inheritance system, perform social welfare functions by encouraging “those with means to provide for
their dependents.”181
Some social groups encourage extended family members to
care for children when the parents are unable to do so themselves; demonstrating the presence and importance of this
moral obligation towards children. “Kinship care giving,” present in the African-American, Asian-American, Latino, and Native-American cultures, is one such example.182 Through this
cultural practice, sometimes called a hidden safety net,183
“hundreds of thousands of American children are now raised by
extended family members and non-relatives rather than their
‘legal’ parents.”184 Furthermore, the basic structure of the family unit and child support is “based on faith that individual
parents’ goodwill and love will motivate them to provide as well
as possible for their children.”185 Scholars have alternatively
described parents’ moral obligation as a “natural law duty to
support their children . . . stemming from the responsibility of
bringing the child into the world.”186
Additionally, courts themselves have articulated
two public policy rationales for extending the obligation of child support to mentally or physically disabled children beyond the age of majority: (1) the natural obligation of parents to support their children,

181. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 199, 205 (2001); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters
1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977)
(“[Inheritance law] encourage[es] those who can to make provision . . . for
those who are or may be dependents.”).
182. Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Families: Building on Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
29, 51–56 (1988); see Foster, supra note 181, at 245–46.
183. Foster, supra note 181, at 246 n.236 (citing Randi S. Mandelbaum &
Susan L. Waysdorf, The D.C. Medical Consent Law: Moving Towards Legal
Recognition of Kinship Caring, 2 D.C. L. REV. 279, 285 (1994)).
184. Id. at 246.
185. Leslie J. Harris et al., Making and Breaking Connections Between Parents’ Duty to Support and Right to Control Their Children, 69 OR. L. REV. 689,
715–16 (1990).
186. Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law Framework—Part II, 69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1064 (2000); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 7, at 435 (“By begetting [children] therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavor . . . that the life which they have bestowed shall
be supported and preserved.”).
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and (2) the need to “protect the public from the burden of supporting
a person who has a parent . . . able to support him.”187

This policy stems from an apparent natural law principle that a
duty to provide for the maintenance of children falls on the
parents, and that this obligation continues until the children
can provide for themselves.188
Society has come to accept that a parent owes his or her
child certain moral duties of care. These accepted moral duties
have stemmed from a combination of various religious
perspectives on the parent/child relationship, as well as a multitude of philosophical ideals that have developed over time. It
is not possible in a paper of this length to give a complete account of the various religious and philosophical perspectives
that might bear on the problem. A simplified—perhaps even a
profoundly oversimplified—account may nevertheless be useful.
A. RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
Religion in its many forms has “exercised a profound influence on the development of human culture . . . [and] it has offered powerful motives to right conduct.”189 This section explores the manner in which the three major religions most
widely practiced in the United States treat issues of parental
support of children, and how that treatment fosters a moral
duty of care towards adult disabled children. All three religions
recognize parental obligations to a disabled child.
1. Christianity
Christianity is the “most widely distributed of the world religions, having substantial representation in all the populated
continents of the globe and a total membership that may exceed
a billion people.”190 As one author noted, “the inherent worth of
every person as one who has been created in the image of God,
the sanctity of human life and thus marriage and the family,
the imperative to strive for justice even in a fallen world—all of
187. Jeffrey W. Childers, Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Continued Parental Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in
North Carolina, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2094, 2100 (2002) (quoting Chun v. Chun, 235
Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)).
188. Id.
189. 12 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 746 (Charles G. Herbermann et al.
eds., 1911).
190. 6 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 250–51 (Norma H. Dickey
ed., 1986).
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these are dynamic moral commitments that Christians would
accept.”191 These virtues also “require[s] parents diligently to
care for the proper rearing of their children, that is, to provide
for their bodily, mental, and spiritual well-being . . . in a manner commensurate with their social condition until these latter
can support themselves.”192 Furthermore, the Christian Bible
teaches that parents’ duty to their children is to provide for
them.193 The emphasis on both the importance of family and
the contention that God created every child whether disabled or
not, combined with the obligation of parents to care for their
children, all are consistent with the notion that Christian parents have a moral duty to care for their adult disabled children
until those children are able to support themselves.
Some theologians have said that Christianity has not only
influenced but also elevated society through the “fundamental
principle that we are all children of the same heavenly Father
and hence bound to treat our fellow-men not only with justice
but with mercy and charity, the spirit of generous, selfsacrificing service, springing from personal devotion to the Divine Saviour and prompting the practice of heroic virtues.”194
These ideals of charity and goodwill and the spirit of generosity
towards others further enhance the idea that parents have a
moral duty or obligation to care for their adult disabled children. Since Christianity as a whole encourages each individual
Christian to assist others less fortunate than him or herself, it
follows naturally that a parent, who is already under an obligation to care for his or her own children, should also provide for
his or her adult disabled children who are unable to support
themselves.195
Christians believe their “feelings of love, gratitude, dependence, repentance, and obligation” towards God also require
them to act morally.196 And this exact feeling of a sense of duty

191. Id. at 253.
192. 11 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 189, at 479.
193. E.g., 2 Corinthians 12:14; Job 42:15; 1 Timothy 5:8.
194. 12 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 189, at 747.
195. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 321 (F.L. Cross
& E.A. Livingstone, eds., 3d ed. 1997); Matthew 25:34–46 (parable of the sheep
and the goats); Luke 10:30–37 (parable of the good Samaritan); 1 Corinthians
13.
196. Joseph G. Allegretti, Can Legal Ethics Be Christian, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 453, 459 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds.,
2001).
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to act morally encourages, if not requires, that Christian parents support their adult disabled children indefinitely.
2. Judaism
The Talmud contains the systematic amplifications and
analysis of the Mishnah and other teachings used to interpret
the Jewish law.197 The Talmud never expressly imposes an obligation of parental support for disabled children—in fact, the
Talmud imposes only a minimal obligation of parental support
for children at all.198 One interpretation of the Talmud regarding a father’s duty to his children is that a father has an indirect duty to care for his daughter past the age of minority based
on the concept of charity.199 However, a father’s duty of parental support continues in an indirect manner for minors and disabled children incapable of self support.
Jewish law imposes an obligation on a man to support his
wife both during marriage and divorce, specifying that a man
must provide at least a minimum of care for his wife or ex-wife,
including food, shelter, and clothing.200 This minimum standard of support functions on a sliding scale so that a man with
meager means must provide only a bare minimum, while a man
in a better financial condition must provide more than that
bare minimum for his wife or ex-wife.201 This obligation toward
a wife or ex-wife is the basis for a man’s indirect obligation of
parental support his for children.
Jewish law views the child as an extension of his or her
mother. Hence, Jewish law presumes that a Jewish mother will
not turn her back on her children. The father in turn is required to provide supplemental support to his wife or ex-wife if

197. JACOB NEUSNER & TAMARA SONN, COMPARING RELIGIONS THROUGH
LAW 18–38 (1999). The Jewish religion relies on three different tiers to decipher its law: the Torah, the Talmud, and Shulkhan Aruch. The Talmud is
used to answer many questions on Jewish law and other relevant issues. Id. at
32.
198. See Eliav Shochetman, On Nature of the Rules Governing Custody of
Children in Jewish Law, in 10 JEW. L. ANN. 115, 120. In the Jewish religion,
the financial responsibility of parental support falls on the father only. The
mother of the child is presumed to provide care for her child. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Exodus 21:10–11.
201. See id. A woman’s quality of life is not to change due to divorce, therefore, the husband is to provide financial support to maintain her condition in
life. Id.
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they have children.202 The Jewish tradition presumes that the
mother will use this supplemental support to provide care for
her minor children.203 In this manner, Jewish law provides parental support for minor children beyond the age of six.204
The remaining issue is whether a father’s duty of parental
support continues beyond the age of majority, or, phrased differently, whether Jewish law presumes that a Jewish mother
cares for her children after minority. The Talmud’s express
teachings have been qualified by commentators and codifiers of
the Talmud to answer this question.205 Rabbi Yitzchok Laderstein, a Professor at Loyola Law School, explains that Moshe
Fienstein, a leading commentator on Jewish law, was posed
with a question based on observations of familial relationships
within a contemporary Jewish Community: do parents have a
legal duty to provide for their children until they are capable of
self-support, or is support merely a charity? 206 To understand
the question fully, he says, we must know two facts. First, most
Jewish parents today provide financial support for their children until they are able to care for themselves, regardless of
their age.207 Second, members of the Jewish community traditionally contribute ten percent of net profits to the community
as a form of charity.208 Thus, the issue is whether the support
of children can be deducted from that ten percent of that customary charitable contribution.
Fienstein states that Jewish law develops and adapts to
changes in society, and under that law parents have a legal
duty to provide support for their children.209 Since Jewish parents today provide support for their children beyond the age of
majority, Jewish law continues to presume that the mother will
not turn her back on her adult child.210 Consequently, the father has an affirmative duty to provide financial support to his

202. A father must provide for a child born out of wedlock as well. Id.
203. Shochetman, supra note 198, at 120.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 117.
206. Interview with Rabbi Yitzchok Laderstien, Law Professor, Loyola Law
Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 22, 2002).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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wife or ex-wife that is sufficient to care for any adult children
as well.211
This same duty logically extends to the support of disabled
children. Since parental support for disabled children is common,212 presumably the mother of a disabled child will want to
care for her child until the disability is removed or the child can
care for him- or herself. Thus, the father will have an indirect
duty to provide support for the disabled child.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Israel has indicated the
importance of parental support under Jewish law. The court
has held that parents do not have the right to rely on someone
else to perform their parental obligations as long as they have
the financial ability to do so themselves.213 This observation
suggests that parents of disabled children do not have the right
to shift their natural obligations onto the State if they have the
ability to provide the necessary care. The Talmud’s focus on the
welfare of the child further supports the proposition that parents of disabled children have an affirmative duty to provide
support even in the absence of a written law or command.214
Jewish law views the child “as a precious loan from God [who
is] to be guarded with love and care.”215
3. Islam
Islamic law, in contrast to Christian and Jewish law,
speaks clearly about parental obligations for disabled adult
children. Islamic law holds that “the blood relationship between
the child and his parents, combined with his neediness, entitle
him to maintenance from them.”216 As in Judaism, in Islam the
father alone bears a direct obligation of support to the child.
The Hanafi school (one of four major schools of Islamic law)
goes further and draws a distinction between a female and
211. Id.
212. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 503 (1999); see also Morgan, supra note 59 (referencing other states that do
not have a statute but nevertheless impose an obligation by common law, including the District of Columbia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, and Wisconsin).
213. See Pinhas Shiftman, The Welfare of the Child and Religious Considerations, 10 JEWISH L. ANN. 159, 162 (1992).
214. Shlomo Nahmias, The Law and the Relationship Between Parents and
Children, 10 JEWISH L. ANN. 57, 66–67 (1992).
215. Id. at 65, 68.
216. Ya’Akov Meron, Parents and Children Under Moslem Law, 10 JEWISH
L. ANN. 213, 215 (1992).
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male child, and states that a male child has the right to parental support until the age at which he is able to care for himself,217 while a father’s support obligation to his daughter terminates upon her marriage.218 In either case, a mentally or
physically disabled child, irrespective of age or the time at
which the disability developed, is entitled to parental support.219
While not all formal religious traditions specifically address the issue of a parent’s duty to care for his or her child
past the age of majority, the virtues, tenets, and traditions that
religion promotes tend to support a moral obligation for parents
to care for their adult disabled children indefinitely. As one author has noted, “religion affects the reasons for being moral; . . .
religion affects the character of human agents; . . . religion affects what . . . a person looks to for guidance when confronting
a moral problem.”220 We can expect that these religious traditions may be reflected in the obligations embraced by our legal
systems.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Moral philosophy is “the science of human acts in their
bearing on human happiness and human duty.”221 Throughout
history, many philosophers and intellectuals have developed
theories of morality and ethics. These theories have all contributed, some more than others, to the overall moral intuitions
that underlie American society. This section will examine three
major theories and how they understand parents’ moral obligation to support adult disabled children.
1. Deontology
Deontology emphasizes moral duties and moral rights or
permissions.222 It is the “study of moral obligation,”223 that “ex217. Cf. DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 430 (3d ed.
1998) (stating that a father has an obligation to care for his daughter until she
is married and has an obligation to care for his son until he reaches puberty).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 430 n.83.
220. Allegretti, supra note 196, at 459.
221. JOSEPH RICKABY, MORAL PHILOSOPHY: ETHICS, DEONTOLOGY AND
NATURAL LAW 1 (1919).
222. Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 211 (2001).
223. RICKABY, supra note 221, at 2.
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pounds and vindicates the idea, I ought.”224 Deontology is the
“science of ethics,”225 and the “science of Duty.”226 It is an approach to ethics that posits that we have a duty or obligation to
treat other human beings in particular ways simply because
they are human and we must therefore respect their rights and
dignity.227 A deontologist believes that actions are intrinsically
right or wrong—if you violate someone’s rights, you commit a
moral wrong, regardless of the consequences.228
The standard example of deontological moral theory is
Immanuel Kant’s theory of categorical imperatives.229 According to Kant, a categorical imperative is a “command (imperative) that holds with no exceptions or qualifications (categorically).”230 Kant believed that everyone knows the difference
between right and wrong. In order to determine the rightness
or wrongness of an action, one must decide if the action conforms to or obeys that known moral law.231 Kant wrote that
morality requires that everyone “[a]ct in such a way that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply
as a means”—in other words, to treat them with all respect due
to a human being.232 Kant argued that one should “act on the
basis of principles that you would want everyone else to act
upon.”233
Deontological ethics would likely hold that parents should
care for their adult disabled children indefinitely because it is
the right thing to do.234 Parents “have brought a Being into the
world who becomes in fact a Citizen of the world, and they have
placed that Being in a state which they cannot be left to treat
with indifference.”235 According to Kant, “duties of justice are
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at viii.
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS (James Hastings ed.).
RICKABY, supra note 221, at viii.
THOMAS I. WHITE, RIGHT AND WRONG: A BRIEF GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING ETHICS 62 (1988).
228. Id.
229. Solum, supra note 222, at 211.
230. WHITE, supra note 227, at 69.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Solum, supra note 222, at 211.
234. See H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION AND DUTY AND INTEREST 10
(1968).
235. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115 (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark) (1887).
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external duties,” and the duty is “just to do” or “perform” the
act.236 Caring for children, regardless of age, who are unable to
care for themselves, reflects the basic respect for humanity that
Kant discussed in his theories. Parents should care for their
own children as they would have wanted their parents to care
for them, and as they will want their children to care for their
grandchildren in turn. For as Kant himself wrote:
Children, as Persons, have, at the same time, an original congenital
Right—distinguished from mere hereditary Right—to be reared by
the care of their Parents till they are capable of maintaining themselves; and this provision becomes immediately theirs by Law, without any particular juridical Act being required to determine it.237

The things that people ought to do, and what they feel is correct
or moral, are these ideas that Kant established that respect the
basic rights and freedoms of humanity. Thus, deontology
supports the contention that parents should care for their adult
disabled children indefinitely.
2. Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is most often associated with Aristotle and
his theory of virtues as acquired dispositional qualities.238
These virtues are characteristics of mind and will that constitute a good life, where happiness consists of a life lived in accord with the virtues.239 Accordingly, a “society composed of
such persons will also flourish,” while a person who possesses
the corresponding vices “cannot be happy and will not contribute to the happiness of others.”240 Thus, these “virtue-centered
theories focus on character rather than action.”241 Virtue ethics
does not focus on the motives of an individual, but rather “identifies particular traits as more or less worthy” and then examines specific acts to determine if “they are of the kind a person
possessed of worthy character traits would perform.”242
Since virtue ethicists place such emphasis on the virtues of
the individual and what he or she can or will add to society,
they would most likely support parents caring for their adult
236. Christine M. Korsgaard, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant
on the Right to Revolution, in RECLAIMING THE HISTORY OF ETHICS ESSAYS
FOR JOHN RAWLS 297, 300 (Andrews Reath et al. eds., 1997).
237. KANT, supra note 235, at 114.
238. Solum, supra note 222, at 212.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 214.
242. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2000).
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they would most likely support parents caring for their adult
disabled children. The focus on the particular character of an
individual would lead parents to question how other parents
would handle the same situation. Society as a whole would prefer “parents to care for their children,” and other members of
their family “out of love” instead of a particular duty dictated
by justice.243 “Virtue ethics expands morality to . . . [include a
variety of values] that figure into human life,” including both
individual and social decisions concerning the enhancement of
“overall quality of human lives.”244 One can see virtue ethics in
practice in many areas such as family law, where the interests
of the child and the child’s well-being are more prevalent than
the needs or concerns of the parents.245 Thus, followers of Aristotle and other more modern theories of virtue ethics would
support the moral obligation of parents to care for their adult
disabled children until they are able to care for themselves.
3. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism signifies that “the ultimate end is and ought
to be general happiness, and that those actions are right which
bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number.”246 This
theory, first distinctly formulated by Jeremy Bentham,
prioritizes the general happiness of the greatest number of
people, not just that of an individual.247 Later, J. S. Mill emphasized that “the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness
and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”248 As a
moral theory, utilitarianism says that “utility should be used as
the guide to individual moral choice.”249 Thus, using this theory, we answer such moral questions as should I care for my
child affirmatively because such care will enhance utility.250
Utilitarianism does not establish specific duties other than the
principle that one must perform an act if that act will produce
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Solum, supra note 222, at 215.
Feldman, supra note 242, at 1437.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West Supp. 2006).
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 558 (2003).
See id. at 558–66.
Id. at 562.
Solum, supra note 222, at 209.
Id. at 210.
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greater utility.251 Therefore, under normal or usual circumstances, parents are in the best position to care for their children because “parents prefer to do this, because parents can do
it at a lower cost than others, and because children derive
greater benefits from parental care than care in orphanages or
foster homes.”252
As Thomas White stated, “Bentham tells us that if we want
to determine the moral character of an action, we should see
how much pleasure it produces.”253 Modern American society
and its current views on morality have stemmed from a variety
of European philosophers.254 Although differing in their views
on people, character, and actions, most of these philosophers
would support the contention that parents do in fact have a
moral obligation to care for their adult disabled children indefinitely. The philosophical approach addresses more about
how people can be rather than how most of us are and displays
the best qualities and possibilities of humanity, which are the
characteristics of people that are positive and uniquely human.255
C. MORAL DUTIES OF SOCIETY
The foregoing religious and philosophical perspectives illustrate the strong moral obligations placed on parents to care
for their adult disabled children past the age of majority. These
moral obligations, however, do not end with parents. In fact,
many of the best known political, philosophical, and religious
thinkers have contemplated society’s moral duty to care for the
destitute and disabled. Aristotle, for example, recognized the
right of the disabled to obtain subsistence from public funds.256
John Locke’s “‘first and fundamental natural Law’” was “‘the
preservation of the Society, and . . . of every person in it.’”257
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. WHITE, supra note 227, at 43.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking
Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22–23 (1987) (quoting Aristotle, The
Constitution of Athens, in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY AND
OLIGARCHY 190 (J. Moore trans., 1975)).
257. Samuel Freeman, Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Distressed, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1455, 1465 (1994) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698)).
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With this most basic political principle, he argued that individuals have a natural right to the material necessities for survival thereby entitling them to obtain necessities in the form of
charity from the government, if needed.258 Hobbes’s prudential
social contract doctrine also acknowledged “public assistance
[programs] as a legitimate and necessary government function.”259 Authorizing such assistance, Hobbes commented, “‘And
whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to
maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left
to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for . . . by
the Laws of the Commonwealth.’”260 Like Locke, Hobbes recognized the dangers of relying on private charity, further commenting: “‘[f]or as it is uncharitableness text in any man, to
neglect the impotent; so it is in the Sovereign of a Commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity.’”261 Similarly, Kant required governments to put into place
public institutions to help the destitute, charging citizens with
“the perfect duty to support them.”262
Christian, Jewish, and Islamic religious traditions all acknowledge man’s unique moral worth, as derived from the possession of a soul.263 This recognition of inherent worth necessarily exhibits concern for man’s material welfare.264 Universal
modern values embrace society’s obligation to provide for human welfare. For example, Article 25 of the United Nations’
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services . . . .”265

258. See Joan L. McGregor, This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My
Land: A Philosophical Reflection on Natural Rights to Property and Environmental Regulations, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 87, 94 (1997).
259. Freeman, supra note 257, at 1468.
260. See id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Cambridge Univ. 1991) (1651)).
261. See id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Cambridge Univ. 1991) (1651)).
262. See id.
263. Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality and Transcendentalism: Beyond
Autonomy, 57 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1997).
264. See id.
265. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217A, at
71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1984); see
also Edelman, supra note 256, at 20.
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Exactly which social services our government should provide is the subject of much debate. Ronald Dworkin, a contemporary Anglo-American legal scholar, has asserted that since
society has a moral responsibility to accommodate individuals
with disabilities, the government should act to fulfill this duty
by providing the equivalent of an insurance system for the disabled.266 Dworkin premises his argument on Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” theory, in which principles of justice are abstracted
from an “‘original position of equality,’” in which “‘no one knows
. . . his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like.’”267 Since people “in
the original position must consider whether they . . . may be
members of the least advantaged class in society[,] . . . [they]
will choose principles of justice that maximize the life prospects
of a disadvantaged class.”268 Dworkin believes that prior to
birth, individuals would be willing to pay into an insurance system capable of compensating them, should they be born disabled.269 Under this maxim, justice requires support of the disabled. Implying that support obligations should not fall on the
parents alone, Dworkin further argues that the government is
in the best position to establish such a system.270
While parents have a moral duty to support their disabled
children, our religious and philosophical traditions suggest that
society shares this obligation. There is a consensus that a just
society will not abandon human beings in need. A parent’s
natural duty to help his adult disabled child merges with society’s moral duty to provide public assistance to the disabled,
and when such institutions do not exist, society has the added
duty to bring them into existence.271 One final question, then,
remains: Does the existence of a moral duty necessarily imply
that the state should impose a legal duty as well?

266. Friedland, supra note 58, at 191–92.
267. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971); see Mark S. Stein,
Rawls on Redistribution to the Disabled, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 997, 998
(1998).
268. STEIN, supra note 267, at 998.
269. Friedland, supra note 58, at 191–92.
270. Id. at 192 (arguing that “market-based insurance cannot remedy the
contingency of disability” and that the government is in the best position to
spread the costs of accommodating those with disability widely).
271. See Freeman, supra note 257, at 1468–69.
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IV. LEGAL DUTIES
The problem of the relationship between law and morality
is a thorny one. At least some basic aspects of that relationship,
however, are clear. On one hand, “many moral principles have
no backing from the law,” and in general, the law does not enforce morality.272 On the other, there are significant overlaps
between our moral and legal obligations.273 For example, tort
law recognizes a moral duty of care to prevent foreseeable harm
to others.274 Criminal law deals with responsibility for harmful
acts, employing moral judgments to ascertain the culpability of
the criminal’s mental state.275 Even contract law has a moral
dimension when considering whether promises made as part of
contract should be legally binding.276
Nevertheless, American law does not recognize any
overarching duty to assist.277 As a general rule, “‘one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can
be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself.’”278
There is no such duty even if the one in peril is the adult child
of the one whose duty is at issue. We may condemn a parent
morally for failing to come to the aid of his adult child, but in
general we do not render him legally liable for such failure.
While this “no duty” rule may occasionally offend our moral
sensibilities and defy our natural inclinations, several theoretical and practical considerations arguably justify it. Submitting
272. Posner, supra note 179, at 1694–95.
273. Id. at 1694.
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
275. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 49 (2006).
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 cl. 1 (1981).
277. David C. Biggs, “The Good Samaritan Is Packing”: An Overview of the
Broadened Duty to Aid Your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess
Concealed Weapons, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 226, 227 (1997). But see Justin T.
King, Criminal Law: “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” Sherrice’s Law: A Balance of
American Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 621–22 (1999)
(stating that eight states have enacted “Good Samaritan statutes” that prescribe an affirmative duty to assist, and every state (including the District of
Columbia) has passed statutes to relieve rescuer liability); John T. Pardun,
Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
591, 594 n.18 (1998) (recognizing that there is a common law exception to the
“no duty” rule that arises in the context of “special relationships” between the
victim and would-be rescuer). “Certain people have a duty of care toward others because of their relationship, usually one of dependency: the physician toward his patient, the shopkeeper toward his customer, the employer-employee,
parent-child.” Pardun, supra, at 594 n.18 (citation omitted).
278. Biggs, supra note 277, at 619 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 203 (2d ed. 1986)).
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these justifications to exacting scrutiny, the following analysis
supports the conclusion that the state should not compel familial support of disabled adult children, but should instead take
that duty upon itself.
A. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several theoretical considerations support the argument
that the state should not legislate a legally enforceable family
support duty in this context. First, many commentators assert
that we should not legislate morality.279 Second, helping a person in distress is recognized to be an altruistic act, worthy of
encouragement. True altruism is “not motivated by the promise
of reward or the threat of punishment”; it is motivated instead
by love, compassion, or sympathy.280 A third theoretical approach that justifies a “no duty” approach is that our country is
founded on the principle of individual liberty, under which no
person has any positive, enforceable legal obligation to others
except for those obligations that the person has voluntarily accepted.281
The first argument used to support this approach is that
legislating morality is problematic.282 Every person is considered a “free moral agent,” and morally bankrupt behavior is not
always punishable as a crime.283 For example, lying or adultery
may be considered morally bankrupt, but those actions are not
typically criminal.284

279. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004); King,
supra note 277, at 619; see Posner, supra note 179, at 1658.
280. Posner, supra note 179, at 1658.
281. Pardun, supra note 277, at 603.
282. Mario J. Rizzo, The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New Argument
Against Moralistic Legislation, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 789, 799 (2005)
(arguing that the State should not legislate morality because even when society can agree on a moral framework, specific moral choices require
knowledge of specific circumstances that are not foreseeable at the time the
legislation is passed).
283. See King, supra note 277, at 638 n.178 (“Every United States citizen is
considered a ‘free moral agent,’ unless he or she is imprisoned or otherwise
lawfully constrained.”).
284. Rob Atkinson, Lucifer’s Fiasco: Lawyers, Liars, and L’Affaire Lewinsky, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 596 (1999) (observing that “[l]ying is not perse,”
but pointing out exceptions for fraud and perjury); Sarah Catherine Mowchan,
Note, A Supreme Court that Is “Willing to Start Down That Road”: The Slippery Slope of Lawrence v. Texas, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 125, 133–36 (2004)
(discussing the current constitutional status of adultery statutes).
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A second argument holds that when the government imposes an affirmative legal duty, conduct that might otherwise
have been altruistic becomes forced, and that change undermines the give and take of the true altruistic relationship.285
Applied in the intrafamilial context, this argument seems
plausible. We expect financially capable parents to want to help
their adult disabled children for genuinely altruistic reasons—
out of love and compassion for them—and we expect the adult
child to reciprocate to the extent she is able.286 When such aid
occurs in the context of a loving interpersonal relationship, reciprocal affection creates a healthy interdependence.287 We expect both parties, parent and child, to work toward the day
when the child attains some greater measure of selfsufficiency.288 However, when aid becomes a legal entitlement,
loving interdependence risks becoming an antagonistic exaction. Now the adult child has an incentive to remain disabled
and dependent for as long as possible.289 Not only is the parent
less likely to think well of the child—and, as a consequence,
less likely to provide the non-monetary support and aid parents
commonly provide their adult children—but the child is also
less likely to think well of herself.290 Whereas a democratic ma285. Sheldon Richman, Op-Ed., You Can’t Legislate Goodwill, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 1997, at 19 (“People might find Good Samaritan laws
reasonable because they believe people should help others in distress. But
where individual rights are respected and government power is limited, good
will cannot be enshrined in the law. It would undermine freedom.”); see
Pardun, supra note 277, at 604 n.84.
286. See Catharine H. Stein et al., “Because They’re My Parents”: An Intergenerational Study of Felt Obligation and Parental Caregiving, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 612 (1998) (addressing societal ideals for the relationship
between adult children and their parents).
287. Allan V. Horwitz et al., Caregiving as Reciprocal Exchange in Families
with Seriously Mentally Ill Members, 37 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 149, 159
(1996).
288. See Stein et al., supra note 286, at 612 (“Strong social norms that encourage independence from the family enhance expectations of appropriate
levels of self-sufficiency between adults and their parents.”).
289. Cf. Jack Robles, Paternal Altruism or Smart Parent Altruism? 2–3
(Univ. of Colo. Ctr. for Econ. Analysis, Working Paper No. 98-10, 1998), available at http://www.colorado.edu/econ/CEA/papers98/wp98-10.pdf (observing
that in an altruistic relationship in which wealth is regularly transferred from
a donor to a recipient, the recipient is not incentivized to invest in selfimprovement, but instead to overconsume, and advocating a model in which
gifts of education are used to counter this trend and promote self-sufficiency).
290. Cf. Robin M. Jacobson, Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall: The
Renaissance of Filial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. REV. 518, 539 (1995) Filial responsibility laws, holding children responsible for their elderly parents, have
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jority might willingly grant support in the form of welfare payments, imposing the equivalent of such payments upon an unwilling family causes interfamilial strain that undermines the
loving, altruistic foundation of family life.291
The third argument holds that legally requiring persons to
do everything they ought to do could understandably restrict
the scope of individual decision making. Leaving moral choices
to the individual preserves individual autonomy, and if we
want to retain this freedom for ourselves, we must take the risk
that others will make moral choices we consider to be wrong.292
Furthermore, situations exist in which a popular consensus
would relieve parents of the moral duty to support their
child.293 This feeling is evident in cases where individuals do
not become disabled until they are well into their adult years.
As an adult, a child is capable of abandoning and abusing her
parents, and if she does so, her parents may no longer be morally obligated to provide for her, even if she should later become
disabled.294 The law is ill-equipped to consider all the moral
and ethical dimensions that arise when we derive affirmative
legal duties from moral obligations.295

been criticized for causing social rejection and loss of self-respect among the
elderly, and “it is believed that dependence by the elderly on their children for
their well-being may lead to depression and, ultimately, suicide.” Id. These
same consequences would seem to apply to responsibility laws holding parents
responsible for their adult disabled children. Id.
291. Id.; cf. Julie A. Ruth et al., Gift Receipt and the Reformation of Interpersonal Relationships, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 385, 395 (1999) (observing that
gifts unaccompanied by “symbols of caring” can lead to the deterioration of interpersonal relationships).
292. See Goldberg, supra note 279, at 1283–84 (arguing that lawmaking
based purely on “moral rationales” is illegitimate because people have divergent ideas as to what is moral); Posner, supra note 179, at 1681–82 (arguing
that moral pluralism is important to society, and that having the laws strictly
follow one moral philosophy or another would be “a national disaster”).
293. In the case of alcohol or drug addiction, requiring parents to support
their adult child may mean that the child never seeks help for his or her addiction.
294. Cf. Jacobson, supra note 290, at 544 (observing that filial responsibility laws have several common law exceptions that prevent an adult child from
being required to support their parents and noting that these exceptions apply
to cases where children were abandoned, have inadequate financial ability to
pay support, or were poorly treated by their parents).
295. Rizzo, supra note 282, at 842.
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B. PRACTICAL ISSUES
In addition to the foregoing theoretical considerations,
there are four serious practical problems with imposing a
legally enforceable duty on parents to provide specified
amounts of financial support to their adult children with disabilities. First, courts are not well-suited to adjudicate intrafamily relationships. In divorce, spousal support is typically
temporary, and disappears when the ex-spouse can get back on
her feet.296 Lawsuits between adult children with disabilities
and their parents, by contrast, require courts to mediate intrafamily squabbles indefinitely.
A second problem is consistency. If we believe that parents
should forever bear the burden of their child’s disability, there
is no obvious reason this burden should end when the parents
die. The logic underlying statutes that require parents to support their adult children with disabilities is enforced by statutes that provide for preferential inheritance for such adult
children as well.297 In addition, it is not obvious why the duty to
support should be restricted to parents. If the purpose of imposing the duty is to protect the public fisc,298 the law could better
serve that purpose by imposing the same duty on siblings,
grandparents, and other family members, as in the case with
Poor Person Statutes
A third problem is fairness. If we are going to legislate morality in the context of adult disabled children, our laws need to
match our moral intuitions in this context. Our moral intuitions, in turn, are likely to be finely nuanced. Whether we believe a parent has a moral duty to support may turn on how the
child has treated the parent, on the genuineness of the child’s
efforts to become self-sufficient, or on competing claims to the
parent’s resources. No blanket legal rule of support is likely to
be able to capture those nuances, and any blanket legal rule
that cannot do so is confiscatory.
296. Charlotte K. Goldberg, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Premarital Agreements and Spousalsupport Waivers in California, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245,
1261 (2000) (noting that California has a “policy of assisting a spouse to become self-supporting” by awarding temporary spousal support).
297. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540(a)(3) (West 1991) (“Adult children of
the decedent who are physically or mentally incapacitated from earning a living and were actually dependent . . . upon the decedent for support [are entitled to such reasonable family allowance out of the estate as is necessary for
their maintenance according to their circumstances during administration of
the estate].”).
298. See Childers, supra note 187, at 2100.
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Finally, allowing family members to file lawsuits against
each other is an inherently problematic solution to which we
should turn only as a last resort. In many respects, family is a
bedrock institution of our society.299 Allowing family members
to sue each other for money risks damaging that institution.300
Saving the public fisc is not a sufficient reason to take that
risk.
Each of these practical reasons, as well as the theoretical
issues discussed above, combine to make clear that imposing a
legal duty on parents to support their adult disabled children
would be unwise.
1. The Inability of the Court System to Adjudicate
Parent/Adult Child Support Cases
Courts can determine with relative ease whether parents
should support their minor children. If the parental relationship has not been terminated, courts only ordinarily need to
pose two questions: the age of the child and the amount of the
parent’s income.301 This simple approach applies regardless of
whether the parent retains custody and the power to order the
child’s life.302
Determining whether to order a parent to support her
adult disabled child, by contrast, requires much more difficult
factual determination on the part of a court. An obvious preliminary question is whether the child is “disabled.” In states
that require parental support of children with disabilities, the
term “disability” remains largely undefined. In federal law, two
very different definitions are used for very different purposes.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an
“individual’s disability is (A) physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.”303 The Social Security system, by
299. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 611 (1987).
300. Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging World: Sharing Public
and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
563, 757 (2002) (“In some states, children who fail to support their indigent
parents may be found guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony under the state’s
criminal law. A finding that an adult child has refused or neglected to support
her parent or parents could result in a fine or imprisonment.”).
301. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (amended 1971 and 1973),
9A U.L.A. 400 (1987).
302. Id.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(C) (2000).
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contrast, defines disability as “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”304 The purpose of the ADA is to prohibit discrimination against a group
historically subject to significant discrimination and to help
that group integrate into the mainstream.305 The purpose of the
Social Security system, by contrast, is to provide support for
those unable to support themselves. The Social Security definition of “disability” is therefore more relevant to state rules requiring the support of adult children with disabilities.306
Regardless of the definition a state chooses to adopt,
whether relying on federal law or otherwise, the determination
of whether someone is “disabled” is expensive and complex. For
example, the ADA definition requires expert testimony concerning (1) the physical or mental impairment; (2) the substantial nature of the impairment including the effects of any mitigating measures; (3) a comparison with the “normal”
population; and (4) the major life activity allegedly limited.307
Likewise, the Social Security Administration uses a complex
procedure to determine whether an individual meets the statutory criteria for assistance.308 A claimant must establish that
she is not engaging in any substantial and gainful activity. She
must also show that she meets the statutory severity requirement by showing either that she has an impairment the Act
deems so severe as to automatically preclude substantial gainful activity; or that she is in fact unable to perform her prior occupation.309 Once these showings are made, the claimant is
deemed disabled and entitled to benefits unless the Social Security Administration can demonstrate that she has the ability
to “perform other work in the national economy.”310 Application
of the Social Security definition also commonly requires extensive expert testimony, not merely with respect to the nature of
the individual’s problems, but also with respect to the availabil304. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
305. Theodore P. Seto & Sande Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay
and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1061, 1070 (2006).
306. Id.
307. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 473–74 (1999).
308. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140–42 (1987).
309. Id. at 141.
310. Id. at 142.
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ity of gainful work for which the individual might nevertheless
be suited.311 The Social Security Administration has the necessary resources readily available to litigate such cases; parents
typically do not.
Having decided that an adult child is disabled, the court
faces sometimes intractable problems in the intrafamilial context in determining whether it would be appropriate to order
financial support—problems that do not arise in the ADA or
Social Security context. What if the family is trying to encourage the alcoholic adult disabled child to get sober? Which side
should the court take? What if the family is trying to ensure
that the adult disabled child with mental illness takes her
medication? What if the parents are trying to save financial resources against a genetically probable onset of Alzheimer’s?
What if they believe that a more productive use of their limited
resources would be to fund another child’s college education? It
seems unlikely that any state would require an order of financial support regardless of the answers to these questions. Adjudicating such questions is well beyond a court’s institutional
competence.312
2. Consistency
State rules requiring the support of adults with disabilities
are internally inconsistent in at least three regards. If the purpose of a law requiring parents to support their adult disabled
children is to transfer the responsibility from society to the
parent, and if there are many ways in which this transfer can
be accomplished, then the lack of reliance on these solutions
creates inconsistency within the statutory regimes. Because
laws recognizing a duty of support do so inconsistently, states
should either reform their statutory frameworks to achieve
consistency or abandon these laws as a matter of public policy.313
311. Id.
312. Cf., e.g., Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The
Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts’
Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1893–94 (1998)
(“Competency questions ask whether the judicial response is appropriate for
the desired results. Because education is governed by a plethora of complex
issues, the judiciary has been deemed the least capable institution to determine policy within this social institution.”).
313. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2006 (2003) (stating that there is no
duty to support adult children), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320B (2002)
(stating that parents must provide continuing support for adult disabled chil-
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The requirement that parents support their adult children
with disabilities terminates upon the parents’ deaths. A consistently applied support requirement would extend to intestacy
and inheritance rules, requiring parents to devise sufficient resources to support the adult child with disabilities for the remainder of that child’s life. Only one state, Louisiana, has any
such protection for children. In other states, however, the rules
of inheritance work differently:
Modern American rules governing inheritance . . . are largely based
on the right of a person to dispose of her own property in any way she
sees fit. Potential beneficiaries, including children and other direct
descendants, generally have no ownership rights in property during
the owner’s lifetime and have no absolute right to receive the property
of any decedent. This freedom of testation is somewhat restricted by
statutorily imposed requirements that the testator provide for the
surviving spouse.314

If a duty of support is imposed as a matter of principle and
not merely as a convenient way of saving public funds, inheritance rules should require parental support after death as well.
Because Black Letter Law dictates otherwise, statutory
schemes that require parents to support their adult disabled

dren if disability occurred before he or she reaches age of majority), and CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3910(a) (West 2004) (stating that parents must provide support
for adult children with disability regardless of when the disability occurred).
314. Layton v. Layton, 139 S.E.2d 732, 734 (N.C. 1965) (“The common law
obligation of a father to support his child is not ‘a debt’ in the legal sense, but
an obligation imposed by law. It is not a property right of the child but is a
personal duty of the father which is terminated by his death.”); id. (“The support of a child by a parent may be the subject of contract and a father may by
contract create an obligation to support his child which will survive his death
and constitute a charge against his estate, in which case the ordinary rules of
contract law are applicable.” (citation omitted)); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (1994) (“In
the United States, only [Louisiana] currently provides direct, systematic protection to a child intentionally disinherited by a parent. In all other states, the
testator is free to disinherit even needy, minor children, regardless of the size
of the estate.” (citation omitted)); Judith G. McMullen, Family Support of the
Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create Incentives to Support Disabled Family Members, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 439, 443 (1990); see also Melanie B.
Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235 (1996)
(responding to court manipulation of testamentary formalities in preference of
family members with the argument that “‘[t]he first principle of the law of
wills is freedom of testation.’ One has a right to distribute property upon death
solely according to the dictates of one’s own desires, unfettered by the constraints of society’s moral code or the claims of others” (quoting John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491
(1975))).
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children should be rejected as a matter of public policy for inconsistency.315
Additionally, if the parent-child relationship is the source
of the support duty, it is unclear why the support requirement
should flow only one way. If states impose onto parents a legal
duty to support their adult disabled children, they should also
impose a duty on children to support their disabled parents.
Civil filial support laws are currently in effect in twenty states,
and they range widely in scope and are rarely enforced.316 Relatively few cases invoking these laws are reported in appellate
court decisions, and trial cases are rarely reported.317 Thus, enforcement of these statutes is difficult to measure.318 Although
the enforcement of filial support laws has declined,319 state
courts have upheld filial responsibility statutes against constitutional attacks.320 In Swoap v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court upheld a statute that required children to reimburse the state for public assistance provided to their indi-

315. See supra note 314.
316. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.030, 47.25.230 (2004); ARK CODE ANN.
§ 20-47-106 (2001); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4400, 4401, 4403, 4410–14 (West 2004);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 503
(1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-3 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-16-17-1 to -12
(LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 252.1,.2, .5, .6, .13 (West 2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4731 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-214 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428.070 (LexisNexis
2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439B.310 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 167:2, 546-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:1-139 to 141,
44:4-100 (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-10 (2004); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 109.010 (West 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West Supp.
2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-7-25, 25-7-27, 28-13-1.1 (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 71-5-103, -115 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (2005); W. VA. CODE
ANN. 9-5-9 (LexisNexis 2003); Wise, supra note 300, at 574.
317. Matthew Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform
Tool to Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L.Q. 859, 862
(2005) (“Today, thirty states have a civil or criminal filial responsibility statute. Few of those states are actively enforcing their filial responsibility statutes. In fact, eleven states have filial responsibility statutes that have never
been enforced.”).
318. See Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents: Intergenerational Responsibilities in International Perspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV.
401, 428 n.146 (2002) (“California and New York appellate courts reported the
greatest number of cases requiring children to support their aging parents;
California courts reported eight cases, and New York courts reported three
cases.”).
319. Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy
Considerations, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 709, 714–15 (2001).
320. See, e.g., Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 852 (Cal. 1973).
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gent parents.321 The court found that the statute did not discriminate on the basis of wealth, but rather selected children to
bear the financial burden of their elderly parents.322 Consequently, the court held the statute did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.323 The court explained its rationale:
It seems eminently clear that the selection of the adult children is rational on the ground that the parents, who are now in need, supported
and cared for their children during their minority and that such children should in return now support to their parents to the extent to
which they are capable. Since these children received special benefits
from the class of “parents in need,” it is entirely rational that the
children bear a special burden with respect to that class.324

The loss of support for these laws has been attributed to
the social and economic changes that occurred in the twentieth
century, which influenced the structure and substance of the
family relationships.325 However, there is some evidence of continuing public support for filial support laws. For example,
Pennsylvania updated and recodified its filial support law in
2005.326
Finally, it is unclear why a legal duty of support should extend only to parents. Most would conclude that brothers and
sisters have a moral duty to support their adult disabled siblings if they are financially capable of doing so.327 The same is
probably true of grandparents.328 Imposing such an extended
legal duty would clearly help preserve the public fisc. If we are
going to impose a legal duty on parents to support their adult
321. Id.
322. Id. at 850.
323. Id. at 852.
324. Id. at 851.
325. Art Lee, Singapore’s Maintenance of Parents Act: A Lesson to Be
Learned from the United States, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 671, 681
(1995) (“[I]ndustrialization and modernization have led to the decline of filial
support laws is grounded on the theory that industrialization and modernization have caused the gradual erosion of traditional notions of filial piety, as
well as the replacement of the extended family with the nuclear family.”).
326. See Katherine C. Pearson, Re-Thinking Filial Support Laws in a Time
of Medicaid Cutbacks—Effect of Pennsylvania’s Recodification of Colonial-Era
Poor Laws, 76 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 162 (2005).
327. Janet B. Korins, Curran v. Bosze: Toward a Clear Standard for Authorizing Kidney and Bone Marrow Transplants Between Minor Siblings, 16
VT. L. REV. 499, 531 (1992) (“Members of a family are more than a set of individuals who inhabit the same house; they are defined in part, and they define
themselves in part, by the relationships they share with each other. This network of relationships helps to define the moral duties of parents to children,
and the moral duties between siblings.”).
328. Id.
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disabled children, consistency may require that we extend that
duty to other family members, both before and after the parents’ deaths. The fact that we do not do so suggests, again, that
the duty of support is not necessarily imposed on parents as a
matter of principle.
Because of pervasive inconsistencies within these statutory
regimes, public policy requires states to reject this legal duty of
support as the preferential method of supporting disabled
adults.
3. Fairness
Third, if we are going to legislate morality in the context of
parental duties to support their adult disabled children, our
laws need to match our moral intuitions. Otherwise, any legally
imposed duty of support becomes confiscatory.
In the intrafamily context, our moral intuitions are likely
to be finely nuanced. For example, although most would agree
that parents are morally obliged to care for their children, in a
legal and practical sense such a law or obligation would be unfair toward parents. To require that a parent care for an adult
child would force the parent to do something he or she may not
want to do or may lack the ability to do. Such a requirement
would threaten autonomous moral decision making and undermine individualized self-determination. While from a moral
perspective it seems obvious that parents will want to care for
their child, it is illogical in a legal sense to force them to do so.
“In some instances, such as the assertion that a restraint is justified to preserve the morals of the regulated person, the individual claim easily prevails on its own autonomy basis. Even
against a justification based on the moral sense of others, the
claim for autonomy is exceedingly strong.”329
In some cases, the specific disability of the child may compel parents not to support a child, not because they do not love
her, but because they feel it is in the child’s best interest to be
independent and attempt to help herself. Our moral intuitions
might well support the parents’ decision. A blanket support requirement cannot accommodate these nuanced situations. An
adult child possibly capable of self-sufficiency may take advantage of a legal duty of support to avoid work or independence.
Courts administering a blanket legal support requirement are
329. Wayne McCormack, Property and Liberty—Institutional Competence
and the Functions of Rights, 51 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
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unlikely to be able to determine the adult child plaintiff ’s motivations with any accuracy; nor do current state support requirements take such motivations into account.330
Our moral intuitions may also be finely nuanced in terms
of competing demands on the parents’ resources. Parents may
wish to help another child financially—perhaps even a minor
child or a child still in school. Or the parents may correctly
predict that they will need savings to support themselves in the
not-too-distant future. Our moral intuitions may well balance
the net equities in the parents’ favor. In such circumstances,
therefore, a blanket legal support requirement would be morally unfair.
What if parents are unable (but willing to sacrifice), and
parents are morally inclined to assist? However, in the absence
of the moral will or financial means, there should be a uniform
system of government support in place, which will provide for
the adult disabled population in this country. From a fairness
standpoint, there should be no law mandating parental support, and instead there should be programs available to all
families and all adult disabled children equally.
4. Family Discord
In general, the law is extremely reluctant to create intrafamily causes of action.331 Where there is no other alternative—for example, in the context of divorce—it does so.332 By
and large, however, lawsuits are not viewed as a suitable
method for resolving intrafamily disagreements.333 Where the
principal justification for creating a cause of action is to

330. Cf. McMillan, supra note 312, at 1893–94 (noting that in the context of
education policy, where many complex issues arise, judges have been deemed
“the least capable institution” to make policy decisions).
331. Leonard Karp, Civil Relief for Victims of “Uncivilized Behavior,” 17
FAM. ADVOC. 77 (1995) (“For many years, courts and legislatures have used
the doctrines of inter-spousal and parental tort immunity to preserve ‘domestic harmony’ by refusing to allow an injured person to bring a cause of action
against a family member.”).
332. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3109 (West 2004).
333. Kathy A. Hunt, Using Mediation In Family Law Cases, 27 WYO. L.
REV. 32, 34 (2004) (“While the court system is the best alternative for conflict
resolution when all else fails, it is particularly important for attorneys in family law matters to thoughtfully consider the option of mediation. The adversarial method and the imposition of court authority are poor substitutes for the
family itself as the decision-making unit about matters that are of the most
private and important nature to clients.”).
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conserve financial resources, creation of such an intrafamily
cause of action seems particularly inappropriate.
There is a further problem with causes of action for support: in theory, at least, the litigation never ends. Family courts
generally have authority to reevaluate support awards every
time there is a “change in condition.”334 The resulting court orders often modify or reinstitute support obligations imposed
under the terms of a prior decree.335 Any time an adult child’s
disability status changes, further adversarial court proceedings
are required.336 Any time a parent’s financial situation changes,
parent and child, again, speak to each other only through their
lawyers and court pronouncements.337 Family relations are
naturally strained, as family members entangle themselves in
ongoing and messy litigation.
The stated purpose, of course, is to protect public resources.338 Burdening the state courts with perpetual intrafamily litigation, however, will not necessarily achieve this purpose. It may reduce the public assistance roles,339 but it
substitutes a formal support structure with much greater administrative overhead, wasting resources of state courts that
are already overburdened.340
In re Marriage of Drake illustrates this problem. The
Drakes were divorced in 1961. Ten years later, in 1971, David
Drake, their twenty-one-year-old adult son, was diagnosed with
paranoid-schizophrenia.341 Twelve years later, in 1983, he
moved in with his mother. Five years after that, she sued his
father on his behalf for support.342 Initially, the court issued an
order requiring support in the amount of $1350 per month.343
Six years later, in 1994, the mother’s deteriorating health led
334. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 1079 (2006) (“At any time
after the entry of a divorce decree, a court may annul, modify, or vary a child
support award upon an application by either of the parties pursuant to a statute, or pursuant to a court’s own authority.”).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Childers, supra note 187, at 2100.
339. Id.
340. See Catherine J. Ross, United Family Courts: Good Sense, Good Justice, 35 TRIAL 30 (Jan. 1999).
341. In re Marriage of Drake, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 472 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
342. Id. at 472–73.
343. Id. at 473.
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her to hire a live-in housekeeper. As a result, the costs she
claimed as attributable to David’s care increased to $5584 per
month.344 In the meantime, she had set up a trust fund for her
son.345 She died while her request for increased support for her
son was pending.346 Notwithstanding her death, the court denied the father’s motion to terminate the child support order
proceeding and ordered the father to increase his support payments.347 At no time during this process was there ever any indication that the adult disabled child was at risk of destitution
or lack of adequate care. One can only imagine the effect this
had on the relationship between father and son.
In Corby v. McCarthy, the court ordered Daniel McCarthy
to pay $634 a month to his ex-wife for the continuing support of
their disabled adult daughter, Kelly.348 A few months later,
Kelly’s mother sought to increase the father’s court-ordered

344. Id.
345. Id. at 472.
346. Id. at 473.
347. Id. at 478–479. The court held that the cause of action did not abate
on the mother’s death, because a parent’s duty to support an incapacitated
child ran to the child. Id. at 475. The trustees could maintain the action as the
mother’s successors in interest. Id. at 475–76. The trust did not discharge appellant’s support obligation under CAL. FAM. CODE § 3910 (West 2004) because
the son could not earn a living if the trust ran dry. In re Marriage of Drake, 62
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476–77. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s calculation of James’s child support order and affirmed that the Family Code sections
applied to adult disabled children. Id. at 477–78. His payment calculation was
based on the following guideline formula provided by CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 4055(a):
CS = K [HN (H) (TN)].
The components of the formula are as follows:
CS = child support amount.
K = amount of both parents income to be allocated for child support as
set forth [below].
HN = high earner’s net monthly disposable income.
H% = approximate percentage of time that the high earner has or will
have primary physical responsibility for the children compared to the
other parents . . . .
TN = total net monthly disposable income of both parties.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055. The trial court also determined under sections 4061
and 4062 the amount James should pay for medical costs. In re Marriage of
Drake, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. The appellate court determined that although
a trial court may reduce the amount due under the formula if the disabled
child has independent income, the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by not reducing the support in light of the trust. Id. at 479.
348. 840 A.2d 188, 194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003). This was based on Kelly’s
need, which amounted to about $1000 a month, her mother’s annual income of
$20,000, and Daniel’s annual income of about $60,000. Id.
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support payments when the father’s income rose from about
$60,000 to $63,228 per year and her income declined.349 Four
months later, the mother obtained full-time employment; the
father filed a motion to terminate support altogether.350 The
trial court reduced the father’s support payments to $100 per
month, but both parties filed exceptions.351 The state appeals
court remanded the case for a new calculation, which was to include reasonable costs of health insurance and housing.352
There were three trials, an appeal, and a remand for further
proceedings in the space of less than a year, all to save the
state less than $10,000. Again, one has to wonder how the repeated trips to court affected ongoing intrafamily relations. Unfortunately, the complexity of this case is not unusual. When an
adult child with a disability seeks an order compelling support
from one or more of her parents, the ensuing litigation cannot
but lead to a disruption of the family. This is a very real cost—
nonfinancial, but real nevertheless.
Therefore, the disruption to the family relationship and the
other costs that would be incurred further support the argument that our legal system should not impose a legal duty to
support adult children with disabilities.
CONCLUSION
States differ radically in their answer to the question of
whether parents should be subject to an ongoing legal duty to
support adult children whose disabilities prevent them from
supporting themselves. Nine recognize no such duty. Twentyfour recognize such a duty only if the child becomes disabled
prior to majority or emancipation. The remaining eighteen,
plus the District of Columbia, impose a duty of support regardless of when disability occurs.
Morally there appears to be consensus that parents should
support their adult disabled children to the extent they are
349. Id.
350. Id. Kelly was working full-time for the Veterans Affairs hospital, earning a gross income of $16,590 per year. Id.
351. Id. at 195–96 (noting that the master found Kelly could meet most of
her monthly needs and recommended a downward reduction in the support
amount owed).
352. Id. at 219–20. During this trial, both Kelly and Bonnie had separate
apartments in the same apartment complex, although Bonnie spent all her
time at Kelly’s. Since Kelly could not live on her own reasonably, the cost of a
larger apartment or alternative housing arrangement was to be included in
the calculation on remand. Id. at 218–19.
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able. Whether that moral duty should give rise to a legal cause
of action is a difficult question. But for a desire to save state resources, the answer would probably be no. The desire to save
state resources does not, however, outweigh arguments against
recognizing such a cause of action.
I do not mean to suggest that the public resources we have
devoted to caring for adults with disabilities are adequate.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, ten million
adults have disabilities requiring personal assistance to carry
out everyday activities, such as getting around the home, getting in or out of bed, bathing, dressing, and eating.353 Among
those aged seventy-five to seventy-nine, more than half have
some disability, and thirty-eight percent have a severe disability.354 As a given generation ages, the ratio of disabled adults to
the entire adult population in that generation increases dramatically, as shown by statistics compiled by the U.S. Census
Bureau.355 According to the 2000 census, individuals aged
seventy-five to eighty-four numbered 12.4 million, and those
over eighty-five accounted for 4.2 million of the total population.356 Those age eighty-five and over constituted the fastest
growing subgroup within the group of individuals aged sixtyfive and over, and those aged seventy-five to eighty-five constituted the second fastest growing subgroup.357
These statistics illustrate the urgency with which we must
address issues of care for adult disabled persons.358 While it is
reassuring to know that eighty percent of primary helpers are
relatives of the disabled,359 governments must address how to
353. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES
19-1 (2000), http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/profile2000
.pdf.
354. Id. at 19-2.
355. Each successive age group, from the fifteen to twenty-four group to the
eighty and older group, shows an increase in the incidence of disability of any
kind, including severe disability resulting in the need for personal assistance.
The only exception to this trend is a slight decrease in the incidence of severe
disability between the sixty-five to sixty-nine age group and the seventy to
seventy-four age group (30.7% to 28.3% respectively). Id. at 19-2 fig.19-2.
356. LISA HETZEL & ANNETTA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 65 YEARS
AND OVER POPULATION 2 (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbr01-10.pdf.
357. Id.
358. While I use the term “adult disabled person,” I also describe statistics
relating to population growth among the older segments of the population because the incidence of disability is more prevalent as we age.
359. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BRIEF 1 (1997), http://www.census

BUHAI_4FMT

2007]

2/16/2007 10:00:58 AM

CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

767

provide care for the remaining twenty percent. Inviting that
twenty percent to sue their parents is not the answer.
The question ultimately is who should provide such care.
As discussed above, historically, courts and legislatures have
employed a burden-shifting argument to justify the existence of
parental support laws. This policy—that the state should not
have to care for individuals who have family who could support
them—has existed since Elizabethan times. Since then, however, society’s recognition of our collective responsibilities has
expanded.360 In addition, it is not clear that legally enforceable
parental support rules actually protect the public fisc.
Compelling theoretical and practical justifications weigh
heavily against legally enforceable parental support duties. The
theoretical justifications—that we should not legislate morality; that true altruism is motivated by love, compassion, or
sympathy, not by state mandate; and that our nation is
founded upon the principle of individual liberty, under which
each person has no positive legal obligations to others enforceable by the government except those that are voluntarily accepted—compel the conclusion that the state should not require
familial support of adult disabled children. The practical considerations—that courts are not well suited to adjudicate intrafamilial relations of this kind, that legislatures would have
to amend laws governing family relations, that a blanket duty
of support is likely, in many situations, to violate our intuitive
notions of fairness, and that the recognition of legal causes of
action between family members are inherently problematic—
also compel this conclusion.
Most parents love and care for their children. Even if the
children have reached adulthood, most parents do all they can
to provide support. Both religion and moral philosophy support
the idea that parents should, in most cases, do what they can to
.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cenbr975.pdf.
360. Even a century before the rise of the disability rights movement, the
federal government created the world’s largest and most generously funded
social insurance scheme with its pension program for disabled Union veterans.
In 1890, Congress passed the Disability Pension Act, allowing veterans to
claim benefits for disabilities unrelated to their military service. The Social
Security Act of 1935 was a response to problems faced by those forced out of
the workforce by disabilities resulting from an increase in industrialized accidents or old age. While burden-shifting may be an attractive prospect for taxpayers, the need for programs to assist the disabled will always exist. Such
federal programs have existed with success since the end of the Civil War.
This suggests that society is in the best position to assume collective responsibility for our nation’s disabled.
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support their adult disabled children. Nevertheless, this moral
duty should not be legally enforceable. Familial support is best
left to the conscience of individual members. It cannot and
should not substitute for institutions, governmental or otherwise, that provide support for persons with disabilities evenhandedly, without regard to the wealth or status of their parents.

